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ARTICLES

Interpersonal Privacy and the
Fourth Amendment*
ALBERT

I.

W. ALSCHULER**
INTRODUCTION

In this article, I address in a rudimentary way a question that
I knew when I started would prove too difficult to answer: To what

extent does the Constitution's prohibition of unreasonable searches

and seizures protect the privacy of information or property that one

person has shared with another? How large an area of interpersonal
sharing is included within the zone of privacy safeg.ded by the fourth
amendment? To what extent does the amendment protect a form of
privacy that can be defined neither as solitude nor as an exclusive
power to control-a form that might be called "interpersonal"

"relational" privacy?

or

Although the article discusses a variety of substantive questions,

its primary thesis is merely that interpersonal privacy deserves to be

regarded as a distinct branch of fourth amendment scholarship. Courts
and scholars have tended to treat this form of privacy under a variety

of headings without clearly recognizing their interrelationship. The
result has been a crazy-quilt pattern of protection and nonprotection.

* This article was presented as the third Governor James R. Thompson Lecture at Northern Illinois University College of Law on November 18, 1982. It has
profited from discussions with Geoffrey R. Stone and from the able research assistance
of J. Clay Ruebel.
** Visiting Scholar, American Bar Foundation; Professor of Law, University
of Colorado; A.B. Harvard University, 1962, LL.B., 1965.
1. This terminology is inspired partly by Dean Leon Green's demarcation of
"injuries to relations" as a distinct field of tort law. See, e.g., L. GREEN, W. PEDRICK,
J. RAHL, E. THODE, C. HAwKINS & A. SMrTH, CASES ON INJURIES TO RELATIONS (1968).
The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CO ST. amend. IV.
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An issue of interpersonal privacy can arise, for example, from
a routine bailment of tangible personal property. When does a bailor
retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in his property after
entrusting this property to a bailee? When does he have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, not only in the property, but in the place where
his bailee keeps it? Two recent Supreme Court decisions have focused
attention on these issues, and after reviewing some basic fourth amendment doctrines that frequently bear upon interpersonal privacy issues,
the article examines these "bailment" decisions. Then it turns to situations in which a person has shared information rather than propertyin which, for example, he has conveyed financial information to a
bank, or personal information to a psychologist, or a telephone number
that he has dialed to his local telephone company. When may the
government require a person or business entity that has been entrusted
with information to record this information and make the resulting
record available to the government? Again the Supreme Court has
confronted this issue in two recent decisions that the article considers.
The article touches only briefly upon other situations in which
the government invades the privacy of relationships. Obviously any
governmental electronic surveillance of a conversation between two
parties invades interpersonal privacy. So does the use of an undercover agent to infiltrate an existing relationship or to create a new
one by deception. When the government requests or coerces an
employer, spouse or other "third party" to consent to a conventional
search or to consent to some form of electronic surveillance or to
serve as an undercover agent himself, an issue of interpersonal privacy
is presented.
Indeed, in its concluding section, the article offers a suggestion
that may seem a bit bizarre; I admit that I initially found this suggestion somewhat strange myself. Although, so far as I can tell, the
simple coercion of one person to reveal confidential information about
another has never been regarded as presenting a fourth amendment
issue, this conventional view may merit reexamination. On some
occasions, coercion of an informant to reveal what he knows about
another probably should be regarded as a "search" governed by fourth
amendment standards. For fifteen years, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the word "search" as used in the amendment is not
confined to visual inspections and that it encompasses other governmental investigative activities that intrude upon justifiable expectations of privacy. 2 Perhaps this recognition should lead courts to assume
2. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (discussed infra in text
accompanying notes 6-14). .
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a greater degree of control over the privacy-invading informant system
that now is used and abused by the police without significant legal
restraint.
Courts and scholars may have regarded the several problem areas
that I have listed as more-or-less discrete because they have concentrated more on the medium than on the message. For the most part,
the terms used to describe these fourth amendment problem areas
(electronic surveillance, third-party consent, the use of undercover
agents, and officially required recordkeeping) simply set forth a
number of technologies for accomplishing invasions of interpersonal
privacy. The judicial treatment of all of these topics might be informed by a clearer concept than we have today of the extent to which
the privacy of relationships deserves to be preserved from governmental intrusion. Particular technologies sometimes may make a difference, but a number of other things are likely to make a more substantial difference.
For example, to what extent should the character of the interpersonal relationship be influential? How much should it matter whether
the person to whom one gives information is a spouse, live-in lover,
roommate who is not a lover, lover who is not a roommate, lawyer,
employee, customer, business acquaintance, political associate, stranger,
or confederate in crime? Should it matter whether the government
accomplishes its invasion of interpersonal privacy by force, by stealth,
by fraud or merely by asking one of the parties to the relationship
to reveal private information? Should it matter whether an invasion
of privacy by force, stealth, fraud or simple request involves a seizure
of tangible property, a physical trespass, a visual inspection without
a trespass, or a gathering of information that is both nonvisual and
nontrespassory? At least a few of these possible considerations (for
example, the difference between visual and auditory invasions of
privacy) may seem irrelevant to current fourth amendment doctrine.
Nevertheless, I believe that all of these considerations have been and
remain influential whether or not their influence is recognized and
whether or not their articulation could withstand the light of day.
II.

Two BAsIc DOCTRINES

As a prelude to this article's discussion of interpersonal privacy,
it will be useful to review two basic fourth amendment doctrines. Until
recently the first of these doctrines was described by the Supreme
Court as the requirement of "standing," and although the Supreme
Court unfortunately has abandoned this useful terminology,' this article
3. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (discussed infra in text accom-
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adheres to it. In several of the cases that the article will discuss, the
issue is not whether the government has violated the fourth amendment but whether a particular individual has "standing" to assert
this violation and to secure an exclusion of the resulting evidence from
a trial. The basic rule of standing is that a litigant may assert only
a violation of his own fourth amendment rights. This requirement
has been criticized by commentators" and abandoned by a few state
courts in the construction of their state constitutions.' I agree that
the doctrine is troublesome, for it is impossible to articulate any purpose of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule that is not undercut
to some extent by a requirement of standing.
Nevertheless, at least in some of its applications, I believe that
the doctrine makes sense. Imagine, for example, that the police, suspecting that Mr. Big is a cocaine dealer, break into his house to search
for this drug. The police do not have probable cause; they do not
have a warrant; they do not knock and announce their purpose; and
they do not find any cocaine. Instead they find a burglar stealing
Mr. Big's silverware. The police arrest this burglar, and when he is
brought to trial, he objects that all of the evidence against him was
uncovered by a flagrant violation of the fourth amendment. In a sense,
the burglar is correct, but I am sympathetic to the customary view
that he lacks standing to assert this fourth amendment violation. The
police search violated the constitutional rights of Mr. Big, but it did
not violate the constitutional rights of the burglar.
panying notes 16-32), the Supreme Court proclaimed that what had been known as
the "standing" doctrine would no longer bear that name. The doctrine henceforward would be regarded as a matter of "substantive Fourth Amendment law." Id.
at 138-40. Prior to Rakas, however, the Supreme Court had regarded the standing
doctrine in exactly the manner that the Rakas opinion suggested, as a matter of
substantive fourth amendment law. Contrary to Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
majority in Rakas, the Court had not regarded this doctrine as "theoretically separate"
from "the extent of a particular defendant's rights." Compare id. at 139 with, e.g.,
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
The price of the Court's rejection of an established and useful shorthand
expression was merely linguistic awkwardness. The Court declared, "The inquiry under
either approach is the same." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139. But see infra text accompanying notes 35-38. See also 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.3, at 212-19 (Supp. 1984).
4. E.g., J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 73-77
(1966); Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1, 22 (1950) (now Nw. U.L. REV.); Comment, Standing to
Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 342, 347, 349,
358 (1967).
5. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955); State v. Roach,
338 So. 2d 621 (La. 1976).
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A second fourth amendment doctrine provides the central test
for determining when a police search violates an individual's constitutional rights. In Katz v. United States,6 F.B.I. agents believed that
Katz was taking illegal bets at a public telephone booth. The agents
installed electronic equipment on the outside of this booth and turned
the equipment on when they saw Katz enter the booth and close the
door. The agents overheard only Katz's side of the conversation.
Although the agents apparently had probable cause for this investigative
activity, they had not obtained a judicial warrant, and the Supreme
Court held that the surveillance violated Katz's fourth amendment
rights.
The result of Katz may not seem surprising, but the case marked
a major turnabout in fourth amendment doctrine. Prior to Katz, the
Supreme Court had articulated an essentially thing-minded view of
the fourth amendment. It had held, for example, that governmental
wiretapping without any physical intrusion upon a suspect's premises
could not violate the amendment, because the word "search" as used
in the amendment referred to something that an official did with his
eyes, not his ears, and because a conversation could not qualify as
a "thing to be seized," to use once again the language of the amendment.' Justice Black adhered to this traditional view in a dissenting
opinion in Katz that seemed at once archaic and surprisingly powerful;'
and in an effort to fit his case within the standard fourth amendment cosmology of fifteen years ago, the defendant in Katz framed
the issue as whether the F.B.I.'s use of its surveillance equipment
had invaded a "constitutionally protected area." The Supreme Court
rejected this formulation. "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places," it said.' "The Government's activities in electronically
listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied . . . and thus constituted a 'search
and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."'"
To say that the protection of the fourth amendment extends to
situations in which the government violates reasonable expectations
of privacy often does not tell us very much about what the fourth
amendment protects. Our sentiments concerning privacy are ad hoc,
subjective, changing and culture-bound;" and in Katz the Supreme
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
8. Katz, 389 U.S. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
9.Id.at 351.
10. Id. at 353.
11. See Alschuler, A Different View of Privacy, 49 Thx. L.

REV.

872 (1971).
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Court decided to look to these general cultural sentiments in determining the scope of the fourth amendment's protection."2 In part,
Professor Bruno Bettelheim has noted that what one generation could discuss only
in the carefully guarded privacy of a darkened psychoanalytic treatment room, another
generation sets forth in family magazines and on the screen. Id. at 877.
12. This paper does not explore the virtues and defects of the Katz test. Instead it simply accepts that test as the established basis for analyzing what governmental activity amounts to a "search" under the fourth amendment. When I presented
this paper to faculty study groups at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, the
University of Chicago Law School and the Syracuse University Law School, however,
discussion quickly focused on Katz itself. It therefore may be appropriate to devote
a footnote to the aspect of that decision that scholars have found most troublesome.
Katz was in substantial part a lawless ruling-a decision to do without a standard and a decision to tie the constitutional right to privacy to changing cultural
expectations of privacy. Katz therefore seemed to suggest that whenever cultural expectations of privacy evaporated, the fourth amendment right to privacy would
evaporate as well. Once any form of snooping became commonplace, it automatically would become legal. Katz apparently endorsed the principle, "No expectation,
no right."
The most obvious alternative to Katz's culture-bound vision of the fourth amendment would have been a natural-law vision. Rather than effectuate cultural sentiments
concerning privacy, courts in fourth amendment cases might have attempted to
articulate a consistent, core concept of privacy. They might have read the amendment to incorporate their own best assessments of the privacy that human beings
inherently require in order to maintain their individuality and dignity.
One question that the choice between these relativistic and natural-law formulations poses is whether diminutions of privacy through gradual cultural evolution are
truly to be regretted. Is privacy appropriately regarded as a natural virtue, or is
it merely a social construct-a value useful in differing degrees at differing times
and places? Would even the disappearance of privacy through noncoercive social
change be unfortunate?
One can envision (or try to) a society whose members would have little or
no sense of privacy. It would be a society in which, for example, people might engage
in sex or defecation in public without embarrassment and in which people hardly
ever would hesitate to voice their thoughts for fear of personal disapproval or censure. The picture that comes to mind when this sort of society is suggested probably
is not one of a group of people significantly less happy than the people of a privacyconscious culture; but it may be one of a relatively primitive society in which
a number of human capacities would be less fully developed than they are in our own.
At the same time, a diminution of privacy through changing social sentiment
sometimes may seem the mark, not of a primitive society, but of a complex and
maturing one. This loss of privacy may indicate either greater toleration of diversity
on the part of a society or a newfound psychological strength and self-esteem on
the part of those whose privacy is cast aside. When, for example, significant numbers
of homosexuals "come out of the closet," this development may reflect both a greater
acceptance of unorthodox sexual behavior on the part of society and a greater willingness on the part of the homosexuals themselves to endure the disapproval that
remains. Moreover, some nonprimitive societies exhibit near indifference to aspects
of privacy that we consider extremely important. See M. SRINvAS, THE REMEMBERED
VILLAGE

(1977) (India).
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this article analyzes current cultural sentiments concerning interpersonal privacy and suggests that the Supreme Court has subordinated
Even if some basic concept of privacy merited recognition as a natural right
or virtue, it is doubtful that judges who were part of a society that had lost this
virtue could be the ministers of its restoration. It would seem especially difficult
to recreate a lost sense of privacy through decisions under the fourth amendment.
This amendment is not a comprehensive instrument for the protection of privacy-in
part because it restricts only governmental action.
Consider, for example, a judge who in the name of natural justice sought to
recreate the sense of privacy that existed prior to the invention of flashlights, telescopes
and binoculars and who therefore required police officers to establish probable cause.
before making use of these sensory aids. Apart from its other defects, this ruling
would be unlikely to enhance society's general sense of privacy in a significant way.
It would merely deny to governmental officers the use of investigative techniques
that remained common in other sectors of society; and so long as those who sought
to preserve their privacy sensed a need to be wary of privately owned flashlights
and binoculars, the restriction of government officers would seem gratuitous.
Moreover, for a judge to elevate his personal visions of privacy above those of the
rest of society would be arrogant and inconsistent with appropriate concepts of judicial
restraint. A test of constitutional protection that looks to changing cultural sentiments
may raise the specter of adjudication by Gallup poll; but idiosyncratic judicial concepts of natural justice-visions, for example, of an inherent human need for privacy
at odds with the visions prevalent in society-would have less claim to respect.
In America in 1984, the application of fourth amendment standards to the use
of infra-red superscopes would stand on a stronger footing than the application of
these standards to the use of binoculars. The difference between superscopes and
binoculars, however, is merely one of differing cultural expectations. One privacyinvading technology has become common and accepted in a way that the other (so
far) has not. However troublesome it may seem to ground fourth amendment rulings
upon the sands of cultural sentiment, a rough judicial assessment of general expectations of privacy seems almost unavoidable as courts confront cases of magnetometers,
beepers, flashlights, cameras, low-flying airplanes, parabolic microphones, drug-sniffing
dogs and lip-readers.
It does not follow that courts must look to cultural sentiments to determine
the applicability of fourth amendment safeguards in every case. Indeed, Katz did
not suggest that they should. That decision did not propose "reasonable expectation
of privacy" as a universal test of fourth amendment protection; the case said explicitly,
"[The Fourth] Amendment protects ... privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further and often have nothing to do with privacy
at all." 389 U.S. at 350. Much of the trepidation that scholars have voiced concerning Katz may stem from a failure to recognize that Katz supplemented earlier visions
of fourth amendment protections but did not supplant them.
The fourth amendment does have a "natural law" core, one whose meaning
depends neither on evolving cultural sentiments nor on the subjective vision of judges.
The text of this amendment reveals almost unmistakably the natural law vision of
its framers, one tied to traditional concepts of property. The amendment declares
the right of the people to be secure "in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures"; and courts should read this language
to establish an irreducible minimum fourth amendment protection independent of
cultural expectations. When the government seizes someone's body or intrudes upon
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these sentiments to its desire to restrict application of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. It concludes that Katz may not have been
a fourth amendment revolution that happened in 1967; to a considerable extent, Katz may be a revolution waiting to happen.' 3
Plainly Katz itself was a decision about interpersonal privacy.
All of the information that the F.B.I. obtained through electronic
surveillance was information that Katz conveyed voluntarily to someone on the other end of a telephone line. FRom Katz's perspective,
this person was apparently no more than a gambler, a casual business
associate and a confederate in crime. The Supreme Court did not
conclude that the defendant's voluntary sharing of incriminating information with this acquaintance defeated his own reasonable expectations of privacy. Nevertheless the Court recognized that the case
would have been different if Katz had spoken to his customer from
an unenclosed telephone booth on a crowded street corner. It observed,
"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."'
Sharing information with one person, even with a casual acquaintance, is not the same as sharing it with the public; and implicit in
Katz was the proposition that somewhere at or between these poles
is an area of interpersonal sharing that the fourth amendment protects. Nevertheless, far from drawing a presumptive boundary of protection at some point along the spectrum between sharing with one
significant property interests in the course of criminal investigation, an inquiry into
cultural expectations is unnecessary. It does not matter how commonplace or how
accepted this sort of intrusion might have become; the text of the amendment and
the property-based vision of natural justice that it expresses dictate the application
of fourth amendment standards. Moreover, the same non-relativistic analysis may
be appropriate when government officers attempt to separate the privacy "stick"
from the "bundle of rights" traditionally associated with property ownership-when,
for example, they use parabolic microphones to eavesdrop on living room conversations without any physical trespass. Only when traditional property interests are absent
should judges assume the role of armchair sociologists and attempt to assess cultural
expectations of privacy. To safeguard "pure" privacy interests (those unalloyed with
property interests) only when they are supported by general social expectations would
not risk the evisceration of the fourth amendment's most basic protections. At the
same time, a relativistic view of one sphere of fourth amendment protection (a sphere
that the framers may not have anticipated at all) would avoid the pretense that
whatever privacy is vital today is also an immutable part of natural justice. It would
permit a society to abandon some aspects of privacy as these aspects became less
important to its members' sense of dignity and self-worth.
13. See Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and
the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 540 (the Supreme Court has "failed to
pursue the implication of its insight").
14. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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person and sharing with the public, post-Katz Supreme Court decisions have tended to chop at one of the poles. They have argued
on some occasions but not others that any voluntary sharing of information or property (especially with a casual associate or confederate
in crime) defeats one's justifiable expectations of privacy.
III.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND BAILMENTS
OF TANGIBLE PROPERTY

Of course, even after Katz, a central concern of the fourth amendment is the seizure of tangible property; and a relatively simple form
of interpersonal sharing is a bailment, an entrusting of one's property to another. This article's examination of interpersonal privacy
therefore begins with the fourth amendment issues raised by
bailments-issues that take a relatively tangible and a relatively tractable form. Two recent Supreme Court decisions provide an appropriate
vehicle for the effort. 5
In Rakas v. Illinois, 6 police officers stopped an automobile,
apparently because they suspected that some of the car's occupants
had committed an armed robbery earlier in the day. An automobile
stop can be justified on the basis of less persuasive evidence than
would be required for a search of the automobile's interior,' 7 and
the legality of the stop in Rakas was not challenged. 8 Immediately
after the stop, however, the investigating officers searched the interior
of the automobile where they found a sawed-off shotgun under the
front seat and a box of shotgun shells in the automobile's locked
glove compartment.
Two of the four people who had been in the automobile when
the police stopped it were charged with armed robbery. They moved
to suppress the shotgun and shells, arguing that the police had not
had probable cause for their search of the automobile. The Supreme
Court held, however, that simply as passengers the defendants lacked
15. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98 (1980). See infra notes 16-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
and related cases.
16. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
17. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143 (1972).
18. On the facts of the case, the legality of the stop seemed doubtful; and
if the defendants had challenged this stop, all of the evidence that the police uncovered might have been suppressed as a product of this interference with their
freedom of motion. See J. CHOPER, Y. KAMIsAR, & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT:
TRENDS

AND DEVELOPMENTS

Kamisar).

1978-1979, at 160-61 (1979) (remarks of Professor
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standing to challenge the search. Emphasizing that these passengers
had claimed ownership neither of the automobile nor of the shotgun
and shells, the majority concluded that the defendants had established
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or
the area under the seat.
I am no admirer of the decision in Rakas, but I believe that
the five Justices in the majority were correct in their resolution of
an issue that both they and the four dissenting Justices regarded as
the principal issue in the case. A pre-Katz decision, Jones v. United
States, 9 had held that anyone legitimately on premises searched by
law enforcement officers could challenge the legality of the search.
The majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist concluded that this formulation could not survive Katz, while the dissenters argued that Katz
dictated reaffirmation of the "legitimate presence" standard. The
dissenters chose "legitimate presence" as their battleground.
Jones's recognition of the standing of anyone legitimately on the
premises to challenge a search was grounded on the artificiality of
using traditional property concepts to determine the scope of the fourth
amendment's protection.2" The case held that, despite his lack of a
property interest, a person who was a guest in a friend's apartment
at the time of a police search could contest the search's legality. In
that respect, Jones was a precursor of Katz. Nevertheless, the
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard of Katz offered a more
coherent vision of the fourth amendment than the physical-presenceor-absence standard of Jones. Presence or absence is not an appropriate
measure of an individual's justifiable expectations of privacy.
The majority in Rakas noted that only a year after Katz the
Supreme Court had failed to emphasize a defendant's "legitimate
presence" in a case in which this standard plainly would have conferred standing. Instead, in Mancusi v. DeForte,2' the Court had said
that a defendant would establish his standing if he demonstrated "a
reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion." 22
The Rakas majority chided lower courts for woodenly applying the
"physical presence" standard in the years after Katz and Mancusi
without pausing to reconsider the viability of this doctrine. 3 The
majority failed to note that a unanimous Supreme Court-a Court
that included all five members of the Rakas majority-had committed the same error.
19. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
20. Id.at 265-67.

21. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).

22. Id.at 368.

23. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142 n.10.
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Six years after Katz and five years after Mancusi, the Supreme
Court decided Brown v. United States.24 A gang of thieves had stored
over $100,000 worth of stolen merchandise at a store owned by one
of them. After the government conceded that a warrant issued for
a search of this store was defective, the trial court granted the store
owner's motion to suppress the stolen merchandise from use in
evidence. Nevertheless, the trial court permitted the government to
use the stolen merchandise against the other thieves, concluding that
they lacked standing to challenge the search. The Supreme Court
affirmed this ruling. The Court's unanimous opinion by Chief Justice
Burger never uttered the words "expectation of privacy". Instead the
opinion said:
[I]t is sufficient to hold that there is no standing to contest a search
and seizure where, as here, the defendants: (a) were not on the
premises at the time of the contested search and seizure; (b) alleged
no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises; and (c) were
not charged with an offense that includes, as an essential element
possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested
search and seizure.25
That the Supreme Court, a half-dozen years after Katz, was speaking of proprietary and possessory interests and of physical presence
rather than of expectations of privacy suggests the staying power of
pre-Katz visions of the fourth amendment. Nevertheless, Brown
illustrates the artificiality of some of those visions including the
"physical presence" test of Jones.
Imagine that when the police arrived to conduct their search, one
of the defendants in Brown had been shopping for a Christmas present for his mother at the store where he and his co-conspirators had
stored their booty. Under Katz, a thief who chanced to be standing
in the store's checkout line certainly should not have a greater power
to contest the search than his fellow thieves. Perhaps this conspirator
did have a reasonable expectation that the stolen property would remain secure from unlawful governmental seizure at his co-conspirator's
store; but if he did, so did all the others. Physical presence or absence
would not be the touchstone of his legitimate expectations of privacy.
Similarly, a person's legitimate presence in an automobile would
not establish automatically that he had a justifiable expectation of
24. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).

25. Id. at 229. The concluding statement that the defendants were not charged
with a possessory offense was designed to show the inapplicability of the "automatic
standing" doctrine, a doctrine that the Supreme Court now has abandoned. See United
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
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privacy in the glove compartment or in the area under the seat. To
take an extreme example, imagine that a motorist has given a ride
to a hitchhiker who has asked if he may look through the car's glove
compartment to find maps to use in planning the next portion of
his journey. The motorist has denied permission, saying that he keeps
material in the glove compartment that he does not want the hitchhiker to see. Certainly the hitchhiker, despite his legitimate presence
in the automobile, would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the glove compartment. If, despite the rebuff, the hitchhiker were
to give the motorist some money for gasoline; if the motorist were
to place this money in the glove compartment; if the police were then
to search the glove compartment without probable cause; and if the
serial numbers on the bills supplied by the hitchhiker were to prove
that the money had been taken in a bank robbery, the hitchhiker
should not be allowed to contest the use at trial of the bills found
in the glove compartment.
Of course this example is bizarre-an unreal case that only the
twisted mind of a law professor could have contrived. Moreover, the
difference between this case and Rakas is clear. In Rakas, the driver
of the automobile, who apparently also was its owner, almost certainly had given her passengers permission to use the glove compartment and the area under the seat. In all but the rarest circumstances,
a person who stores property in an automobile's locked glove compartment with the automobile owner's permission has a reasonable
expectation that the property will remain private in that compartment.
Cultural expectations of privacy are changing and uncertain, but not
so uncertain as to make a denial of that proposition anything but
silly. Nevertheless, it is the owner's permission and not anyone's
presence or absence that gives rise to the legitimate expectation of
privacy. The emphasis of both the majority and dissenting opinions
on the significance of "physical presence" deflected attention from
the more important bailment issue.
In Katz, the Supreme Court had said, "No less than an individual
in a business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment." '2 6 This recognition of a taxicab passenger's legitimate
expectations of privacy led Justice White to ask in his Rakas dissent,
"Why should Fourth Amendment rights be present when one pays
a cabdriver for a ride but be absent when one is given a ride by
a friend?"" The Rakas majority indicated that it would have allowed
26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.

27. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 167 (White, J., dissenting).
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the owner-driver of the automobile to contest the search,28 and it mentioned more than a half-dozen times the absence of any allegation
by the Rakas defendants that they owned the automobile or the seized
material. The majority thus gave color to the harsh view that
Americans tend to make everything-even privacy rights-a matter
of money; and the opinion invited the jibe with which Justice White
began his dissent, "The Court today holds that the Fourth Amendment protects property, not people ....
The majority said in fact, "One of the main rights attaching to
property is the right to exclude others, . . . and one who owns or
lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude." 3
Nevertheless, the power to exclude is also the power to include. The
Court might have noted that one of the main rights attaching to property is the right to share its shelter, its comfort and its privacy with
others. Insofar as Rakas limited a property owner's power to share
what was hers, the decision did not elevate property rights over privacy
rights so much as it diminished the value of both.
Still, at the time of the Rakas decision, it was not entirely clear
that an automobile owner's permission to store property in the glove
compartment or under the front seat would fail to establish a
reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of a person who had
received this permission. To satisfy the Jones test of standing, it was
enough for the defendants in Rakas to establish their legitimate
presence in the automobile. If they had testified in addition that they
owned the seized property or that the automobile owner had given
them permission to conceal incriminating material inside the car, this
testim~ony conceivably might have been used against them for impeachment purposes at trial." Remarkably, after altering the prevailing test
of standing that the defendants had satisfied, the Supreme Court denied
their request that they be permitted to demonstrate ownership of the
seized property in order to satisfy the Court's new test;3" and just
as the record in Rakas did not establish the defendants' ownership
of the shotgun and shells, it did not establish that they had received
the automobile owner's permission to use the glove compartment and
28. Id. at 143 n.12.
29. Id. at 156 (White, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 143 n.12.
31. Compare United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239, 243 (1974), with New Jersey
v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979). See J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, supra
note 18, at 163-65 (remarks of Professor Kamisar).
32. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130 n.I.
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the area under the seat. Although the Rakas majority emphasized the
absence of any allegation of ownership, it did not discuss the possible significance of the defendants' failure to establish the owner's permission. It was unclear whether the Court's analysis was premised
on the assumption that this permission had been granted or on the
opposite assumption. In other words, the Court did not address the
circumstance that, in terms of ordinary cultural expectations, probably should have decided the case. It might have been possible to
read Rakas merely as a hypertechnical ruling on the state of the record
rather than as a denial of cultural expectations that, were it not for
the opinion, one would have thought universally recognized.
The possibility of reading Rakas in this narrow and technical
fashion disappeared, however, when the Court decided Rawlings v.
Kentucky" two years later. In Rawlings, the Court assumed that a
woman named Cox had given her companion, a drug dealer named
Rawlings, permission to store a substantial quantity of drugs in her
purse. The Supreme Court ruled that Rawlings could not challenge
the apparently unlawful search of the purse that uncovered these drugs.
Rawlings did not hold that a bailor invariably sacrifices the protection of the fourth amendment by entrusting his property to a bailee.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court mentioned several potentially limiting circumstances-that Rawlings and Cox had known each
other only two days, that Rawlings had not used Cox's purse before,
that Cox had allowed someone to look in her purse for a hairbrush
shortly before allowing Rawlings to place his drugs there, that Rawlings did not have authority to exclude other people from Cox's purse,
and that Rawlings admitted that he expected the purse to be searched
(legally or illegally) by the police. Nevertheless, an analysis of Rawlings by Professor Wayne R. LaFave, America's foremost authority
on the fourth amendment, has demonstrated the irrelevance or triviality
of all of these circumstances;3 ' there is no need to repeat here LaFave's
impressive dissection of the majority opinion. The principal significance
of the record in Rawlings was simply that it filled both gaps of the
record in Rakas. Rawlings alleged, first, that he owned the property
seized and, second, that he had received the owner's permission to
store this property in the place that was searched. The Supreme Court
held that neither circumstance established his standing.
The Court responded only briefly to Rawlings' claim that ownership of the property seized should enable him to contest the search:

33. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
34. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 11.3, at 224-31.
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While petitioner's ownership of the drugs is undoubtedly one fact
to be considered in this case, Rakas emphatically rejected the notion that "arcane" concepts of property law ought to control the
ability to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment . . . .Had
petitioner placed his drugs in plain view, he would still have owned
them, but he could not claim any legitimate expectation of privacy.
Prior to Rakas [in which the Supreme Court abandoned the traditional
"standing" terminology], petitioner might have been given "standing" in such a case to challenge a "search" that netted those drugs
but probably would have lost his claim on the merits. After Rakas,
the two inquiries merge into one: whether governmental officials
violated any legitimate expectation of privacy held by petitioner."'
Rakas had emphasized the defendants' failure to allege ownership of the property seized, and it had said that an owner of property
would "in all likelihood" have standing to challenge its search or
36
Accordingly, the defendseizure "by virtue of [his] right to exclude."
ant in Rawlings said to the Supreme Court, "I am the owner." And
the Court responded, "Mr. Rawlings, don't be arcane."
This dismissal of the claim based on ownership was astonishing.
The Court apparently had gone from an emphasis on property rights
in the period before Katz, to an emphasis on privacy rights in the
Katz decision, to renewed emphasis on property rights in Rakas, and
finally to a remarkable situation in Rawlings in which neither property rights nor privacy rights were protected. Nevertheless, the
significance of Rawlings' ownership of the drugs is a more complex
issue than may be immediately apparent.
Analysis can begin with the hypothetical case suggested by Justice
Rehnquist-one in which a defendant places his drugs in plain view.
Imagine that a sidewalk vendor is sitting on a downtown street corner
with his wares before him. These wares are clearly labeled-coke,
smack, speed and weed. A police officer approaches and seizes the
drugs. Justice Rehnquist was undoubtedly correct that, prior to Rakas,
the vendor would have had standing to contest the seizure but would
have lost on the merits. He would have had standing because, prior
to Rawlings, the notion that someone might lack standing to contest
the seizure of his own property would have been unthinkable. The
vendor would have lost on the merits, however, because abundant
probable cause supported the seizure and because there was no
opportunity to obtain a judicial warrant. Justice Rehnquist also was
correct that, after Rakas, the question of standing "merges" with
35. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105-06.
36. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
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the question "whether governmental officials violated any legitimate
expectations of privacy held by petitioner." In fact, for most purposes, the two inquiries plainly had merged long before Rakas. 1 Still,
the question of standing merges only with the question of protectable
expectations of privacy. It is distinct from the questions of p'robable
cause and the need for a warrant. What would doom our sidewalk
vendor would not be the absence of any legitimate expectation of
privacy but the existence of probable cause and circumstances that
would excuse the lack of a warrant.
To demonstrate this proposition it is necessary only to envision
a case in which probable cause is lacking. Suppose that after our
drug vendor has been jailed, his place on the street corner is taken
by a Salvation Army officer with a prayerbook in his hand and a
scarf around his neck. A burly police officer approaches and says,
"In my official capacity, I have decided that your prayerbook and
beautiful scarf might conceivably be useful as evidence in a murder
prosecution. Accordingly I will seize them." He grabs the book, wraps
the scarf around his neck, and resumes his patrol. Certainly a person
should be allowed to contest a seizure of his property without probable cause even when the seizure occurs in a public place. In this
case, the analysis offered by the Supreme Court in Rawlings would
seem either wrong or irrelevant: "Had petitioner placed his [prayerbook and scarf] in plain view, he would still have owned them, but
he could not claim any legitimate expectation of privacy."
Indeed, the seizure of the prayerbook and scarf illustrates a central defect of the analysis in Rakas and Rawlings. Even when the
Supreme Court seemed to emphasize property values in Rakas, it spoke
as if the fourth amendment formally protected only privacy values.
For example, the majority declared, "[Tihe Court has not abandoned
altogether use of property concepts in determining the presence or
absence of the privacy interests protected by [the Fourth]
Amendment." 38 It was this view that, in the end, the amendment protects only privacy that enabled the Court to make its outrageous suggestion that a person can have no reasonable expectation that his property will remain free from governmental seizure when he exposes this
property to the public. Certainly the Katz decision offered no support for the view that property interests matter under the fourth
amendment only when they tend to support privacy interests. Indeed,
Katz had said the opposite: "[The Fourth] Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but
37. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
38. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (emphasis added).
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its protections go further and often have nothing to do with privacy
at all." 39
The Salvation Army officer whose prayerbook and scarf were
seized assuredly did not wish to keep the contents of his prayerbook
private, nor was he at all distressed that the removal of his scarf
had revealed what was under it. His complaint was that the police
officer had stolen his property, not that the officer had invaded his
privacy. Unless the Supreme Court truly would deny relief to this
Salvation Army officer, it seems apparent that the fourth amendment
protects both property and privacy."' A person always should have
standing to contest an illegal seizure of his property."'
This simple proposition may not resolve the issue in Rawlings,
however. Although the Supreme Court's opinion offered no hint that
the nature of the property seized was significant, perhaps the Court
was influenced in part by the illicit character of the seized drugs.
Illicit drugs are contraband and in that respect are different from
prayerbooks and scarves. A ruling that a person has no protectable
interest in contraband and that he can challenge the seizure of prohibited drugs only by establishing a privacy interest in the place that
was searched might not seem notably distressing. Nevertheless, a decision by the Supreme Court more than thirty years ago poses a significant obstacle to this ruling. In United States v. Jeffers,"2 the government argued "that no property rights within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment exist in the narcotics seized here, because they are contraband goods in which Congress has declared that 'no property rights
shall exist'."" 3 The Court rejected this argument, apparently concluding
that prohibited drugs should be treated no differently from other property. If the Rawlings opinion had overruled Jeffers and had emphasized
39. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
40. Of course the word privacy is extraordinarily flexible. One variation of
the word-a variation that has relatively little to do with controlling access to personal information-is suggested by the term "private property." (Of course one use
of property is to shield personal privacy, but that use is not the only one.) By using
the word privacy to encompass two forms of privacy-"informational" privacy and
"property" privacy-one might maintain plausibly that the fourth amendment protects only "privacy." When a defendant asserts an interest in "property" privacy
or in ownership, however, it is irrelevant that he has exposed his property to public
view. Even if it were assumed, contrary to Katz, that the fourth amendment protects
only privacy, Rawlings would confound two distinct types of privacy.
41. Of course the Salvation Army officer might challenge the police seizure
under the fifth amendment "takings" clause as well as under the fourth amendment.
42. 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
43. Id.at 52-53.
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the contraband nature of the property seized, its dismissal of the claim
based on ownership might not have been objectionable.
Even without overruling Jeffers on this issue, the Court might
have articulated a somewhat more plausible basis for its conclusion
that Rawlings' ownership of the drugs was not determinative. Of course
a person should be allowed to contest an unlawful seizure of his property, but once Rawlings' drugs came into view, there was probable
cause for their seizure. If one assumes that Rawlings had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in Cox's purse (if, in other words, one analogizes
the purse to a public place so far as Rawlings was concerned), recognition of Rawlings' standing to contest the seizure might not have helped
him, for the seizure would have been supported by probable cause.
To put the same contention another way, the Court might have held
that although the search of Cox's purse was illegal, Rawlings lacked
standing to challenge this search; and although Rawlings did have
standing to challenge the seizure of his drugs, the seizure of these
drugs was'proper.
There are, however, at least three difficulties with this theory.
First, although the Jeffers opinion is a bit murky on the point, it
apparently rejected this theory along with the theory that the fourth
amendment does not protect property interests in contraband. The
Court declared in Jeffers that the search and seizure were "incapable
of being untied," and it characterized the government's effort to differentiate between them as "a quibbling distinction.""" Second,
although the seizure of Rawlings' drugs may have been supported
by probable cause once they became visible, this seizure apparently
had not been authorized by a judicial warrant. 5 Although the unlawful
search of Cox's purse might not have violated any right of Rawlings,
a court might hesitate to hold that an unlawful police search could
create "exigent circumstances" that would excuse the absence of a
warrant."6
44. Id.at 52.

45. Although the police possessed a warrant authorizing them to search the
house in which Cox and Rawlings had been detained, this warrant probably would
not have authorized a search of Cox's purse. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
46. Perhaps, however, unlawful police action that violates the rights of someone other than the objecting party can give rise to the sort of exigency that would
excuse a judicial warrant. Imagine, for example, that when the police entered the
home of Mr. Big without probable cause and discovered a burglar stealing Mr. Big's
silverware, see supra text accompanying notes 5-6, the burglar was smoking a marijuana cigarette. I doubt that a court should hold the warrantless seizure of this cigarette
a violation of the burglar's fourth amendment rights. If Rawlings lacked standing
to challenge the search of Cox's purse, the warrantless seizure of his drugs might
have been upheld on the same theory.
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The third objection, however, is more telling than the other two.
Rawlings so obviously had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Cox's
purse that it is difficult even to discuss the possibility of differentiating between the search and the seizure on the facts of the case.
If Rawlings' reasonable expectation of privacy in Cox's purse seems
at all doubtful, simply transpose the bailed property once again from
drugs to less troublesome items. Suppose that the owner of a large
purse has given someone else permission to keep his doughnuts,
camera, paperback novel, and letters from his grandmother inside.
A search of the purse that uncovered the items undoubtedly would
invade the bailor's reasonable expectations of privacy (whether or not
his property was seized).
What led the Supreme Court to its elaborate efforts to deny the
obvious in Rakas and Rawlings? The principal reason is not difficult
to discern. In Rakas, Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court, "Each
time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost
.... [Mjisgivings as to the benefit of enlarging the class of person
who may invoke that rule are properly considered when deciding
whether to expand standing to assert Fourth Amendment violations." 4 7
Justice White's dissenting opinion advanced a similar view of the
majority's motivation but characterized it less favorably: "If the Court
is troubled by the practical impact of the exclusionary rule, it should
face the issue of that rule's continued validity squarely instead of
distorting other doctrines . . . ."48
The Supreme Court's reluctance to recognize the implications of
Katz in Rakas and Rawlings may have been understandable; for in
cases in which only tangible property has been seized, an unblinking
application of the principles of Katz might have left intact only a
few limitations on the standing of defendants to challenge searches
and seizures. In terms of general cultural sentiments concerning privacy,
a burglar, automobile thief or other trespasser is very likely to lack
standing to challenge a search that uncovers incriminating evidence
against him. Nevertheless, someone who entrusts property to a relative,
friend or confederate in crime ordinarily has a reasonable expectation of privacy in any private place where the bailee stores this
property.
Of course the fourth amendment restricts only governmental
action, not the action of private individuals. For that reason, a bailor
always must risk betrayal. For example, if a bailee who had agreed
to conceal stolen merchandise were to attend a religious meeting, re47. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 137-38.
48. Id. at 157 (White, J., dissenting).
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pent his sins, and deliver the incriminating property to the police,
the bailor's fourth amendment rights would not be violated." The
bailor also must risk his bailee's negligence and bad judgment; for
example, if a bailee were to keep the bailor's property in a department store window or at some other place where the bailee himself
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy, the police ordinarily would
not violate anyone's fourth amendment rights by examining it. Nevertheless, recognition that a bailment ordinarily establishes the bailor's
reasonable expectation of privacy in whatever private place the bailed
property is kept not only would accord with general cultural sentiments but, in cases in which only the seizure of tangible property
is at issue, would resolve most issues of standing in favor of permitting challenges to the lawfulness of governmental searches and seizures.
This expansion of fourth amendment standing would seem
desirable. For example, it would eliminate the incongruity of permitting a "bad" police officer to search the houses of all suspected
members of a conspiracy without probable cause, secure in the
knowledge that whatever he found in each house would be admissible against all the suspects who did not live there. Moreover, it would
end most incongruities of current standing doctrine without the administrative complexities of a rule that afforded standing to anyone
who was a "target" of a governmental search."0
Nevertheless, the thought of expanding fourth amendment protections is apparently anathema to today's Supreme Court. Rather
than give Katz a straightforward reading that might accomplish this
result, the Court in Rakas and Rawlings turned Katz on its head and
read the case to restrict substantially the ability of individuals to
challenge the legality of governmental searches.

IV.

REQUIRED RECORDKEEPING AND THE

PROTECTION OF SHARED INFORMATION

Were it not for the Supreme Court's efforts to avoid rulings in
favor of defendants on search and seizure questions, the issues posed
by the bailment of tangible property would not seem difficult. When
a person shares information rather than property, however, fourth
amendment questions tend to become more complex. The Supreme
49. This point is developed infra at text accompanying notes 60-65.
50. For a discussion of the administrative difficulties that might be occasioned
by approval of a "target standing" concept, see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 136-37; Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 188-89 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). But see White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118
U. PA. L. REV. 333 (1970).
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Court considered some of these questions in 1976 in United States
v. Miller.5 '
An obviously misnamed federal statute, the Bank Secrecy Act
of 1970,2 requires banks to keep copies of checks and of other records

of their customers' accounts. Prior to Miller, in California Bankers
Association v. Schultz,53 the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act's recordkeeping requirements. The

Court had concluded that whether a depositor's fourth amendment

rights would be violated by requiring a bank to disclose its records

to the government was not a question ripe for adjudication." In Miller,
however, this issue was presented. The government had required the
disclosure of a bank's records of the account of a suspected bootlegger. The way in which the government had forced disclosure of
the records-through a grand jury subpoena-presents some poten-

tially difficult issues that need not detain us." For the Court resolved

Miller on a broad-gauged basis that would have been equally applicable

had governmental officers broken into the bank without probable cause
to seize the records. The Court held that a bank customer has no
51. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
52. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified in part at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1122 (1976)). Presumably this act was called the Bank Secrecy Act, not because
its authors wished to promote bank secrecy, but because they wished to restrict it.
53. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
54. Id. at 52-54.
55. Although the forced production of documents pursuant to a grand jury
subpoena qualifies as a seizure of those documents under the fourth amendment
(see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)),
this seizure does not require probable cause or even reasonable suspicion as those
terms are usually understood. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 208-09 (1946). For that reason, recognition of a bank customer's reasonable
expectation of privacy in the records of his account ordinarily would not pose a
significant impediment to the government's efforts to obtain those records through
a subpoena. In Miller, however, the defendant alleged that the subpoenas had been
issued improperly. 425 U.S. at 438-39. A litigant with a protectable privacy interest
in bank records probably should be afforded the same opportunity to assert defects
in grand jury subpoenas for those records as the bank itself (even when the asserted
defects are nonconstitutional in character).
The Supreme Court may not have understood the rather involved context in
which the constitutional issue was presented. A footnote to the majority opinion
expressed the Court's bafflement concerning the defendant's emphasis on the defective character of the grand jury subpoenas. This footnote declared that the Court
would not "limit" its consideration "to the situation in which there is an alleged
defect in the subpoena served on the bank." Miller, 425 U.S. at 441 n.2. Had the
subpoena in Miller not been defective, however, the bank customer's standing or
lack of standing probably would not have affected the outcome of the case.
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reasonable expectation of privacy in the bank's records of his account.
Even in a case of forcible seizure, the customer apparently would
lack standing to complain.
Reactions to the decision in Miller have been overwhelmingly
negative. Congress promptly enacted new legislation limiting the impact of the ruling;" several state supreme courts declined to follow
Miller in interpreting their state constitutions;5 7 every one of the halfdozen law review comments on the case was critical;58 and I have
yet to encounter a law student with a kind word to say about the
opinion. Most of the criticism has emphasized that bank customers
ordinarily do expect banking transactions to remain private. If a local
newspaper were to publish a human-interest column titled "News from
the First National Bank" a column that described the most interesting
checks that the bank processed during the previous week-the bank's

customers might be more than a little offended. Indeed, if a bank
officer were to disclose at a cocktail party some of the interesting
personal information that he had gathered in his daily work, the
affected customers probably would be entitled to damages for a tortious invasion of privacy or for breach of the bank's implied contractual obligations.

9

56. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1205, 90 Stat. 1699
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7609 (1976)); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, passed
as Title XI of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Control Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 1100-1122, 92 Stat. 3641, 3697 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
3401-3422 (Supp. V 1981)).
57. Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 13 Cal. 3d 238,
529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974); People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d
738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979); Charles v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117 (Colo. 1980);
Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979). See State v. Starke,
81 Wis. 2d 399, 421, 260 N.W.2d 739, 751-52 (1978) (Abrahamson, J., concurring).

58. Alexander & Spurgeon, Privacy, Banking Records and the Supreme Court:
A Before and After Look at Miller, 10 Sw. U.L. REV. 13 (1978); Comment, Government Access to Bank Records in the Aftermath of U.S. v. Miller and the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, 14 Hous. L. REV. 636 (1977); Note, United States v. Miller: Without
a Right to Informational Privacy, Who Will Watch the Watchers?, 10 J. MAR. J.
PRAc. & PRoc. 629 (1977); Note, No Expectation of Privacy in Bank RecordsUnited States v. Miller, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 146 (1976); Comment, A Bank Customer

Has No ReasonableExpectation of Privacy of Bank Records: United States v. Miller,
14 SAN Dio L. REV. 414 (1977); Note, Search and Seizure of Bank Records Under
The Bank Secrecy Act, 51 TUL. L. REV. 723 (1977).
59. See Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961); Grano,

Supreme Court Review-Foreword: Perplexing QuestionsAbout .Three Basic Fourth
Amendment Issues: Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause, and the Warrant
Requirement, 69 J. CUlA. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 425, 440 (1978).
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Nevertheless, the Miller opinion did not deny that bank customers
typically expect transactions with their "personal bankers" to remain
private. A criminal usually expects his confederates in crime to keep
his confidences as well, and the Court said in Miller:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that
the information will be conveyed by that person to the government.
. . . This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Governmental authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose6 0and the confidence placed in the third party
will not be betrayed.
This statement, with its emphasis on a depositor's assumption
of risk, reflects a misconception that has infected a number of Supreme
Court rulings on interpersonal privacy. When law students see the
words "assume the risk" in a judicial opinion, they usually know
to raise a flag. The flag depicts rabbit ears emerging from a top hat,
and beneath the hat is the motto, "Haec propositio circularis est,"
meaning, "This statement begs the question."" To say that a person
must assume the risk of some occurrence is usually unhelpful. What
risks must we assume; what risks need we not assume; and why?
Nevertheless, the statement often made in fourth amendment opinions that anyone who entrusts information or property to another
must assume the risk of betrayal is not conclusory. This statement
merely reiterates that the fourth amendment, like most other constitutional provisions, restricts governmental action and not the action
of private individuals. 6 2 So far as the fourth amendment is concerned,
a person who trusts another with his secret does run the risk that
his confidant will prove untrustworthy. It does not matter how
close the personal relationship between these parties may be or what
cultural expectations of privacy surround it.6 3 If Colonel Mustard's
spouse comes to the stationhouse to reveal that he committed the
murder with the wrench in the dining room, the fourth amendment
60. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
61. I am grateful to Professor Nico Keijer of the Free University of Amsterdam for.suggesting a Latin motto for my flag.
62. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
63. Of course legal doctrines other than the fourth amendment sometimes protect the confidentiality of shared information. For example, the common law evidentiary privilege for confidential interspousal communications might prevent any use
in court of the information conveyed to the government in the hypothetical case
that follows this footnote. See infra note 98.
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neither forbids her disclosures nor prohibits the police from listening. Moreover, it does not matter whether the betrayal is verbal or
visual or involves a seizure of tangible property. If Mrs. Mustard brings
the wrench from its hiding place in a small envelope and deposits
it before the desk sergeant, the sergeant may receive it.6"
The limitation of the fourth amendment to governmental action
means of course that its protection of interpersonal privacy will always
be incomplete. Sharing information or property with other people is
a highly risky enterprise; and no expansive construction of the fourth
amendment is likely to alter that circumstance. Certainly none of the
proposals of this article, however radical they seem, would diminish
the risk of private betrayal. The Supreme Court is justified in regarding that risk as "inescapable" so far as the fourth amendment is
concerned.
At the same time, the Court's repeated observations that one
always must assume the risk of private betrayal have rarely, if ever,
been made in cases in which private individuals have violated the trust
reposed in them. The statements have been made instead in cases in
which the government has employed coercive methods to obtain information from confidants who did prove trustworthy and cases in
which the government seemed primarily responsible for the use of
deceptive methods to induce an initial sharing of confidences. It is
not clear why the fourth amendment requires all of us, whether
suspected of criminal activity or not, to assume the risk of this privacyinvading governmental conduct. Although the Court's statements about
the risk of private betrayal have been accurate, a student who examines
these statements in context should raise his rabbit flag and wave it
vigorously.
In Miller, the confidence placed in the bank had not been
betrayed; the government had forced both the bank's initial recordkeeping and its disclosure of the resulting records. The fact that one
assumes the risk of betrayal by a private confidant simply had no
bearing on the issues in the case." Although the Supreme Court was
64. Indeed, the desk sergeant may ask Mrs. Mustard for further information
about the murder without violating Colonel Mustard's constitutional rights. An invasion of privacy properly can be regarded as the product of private action despite
a degree of governmental involvement.
65. Cf. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv.
349, 406 (1974) ("Analysis of these cases in terms of voluntary assumption of the
risk is wildly beside the point.").
I believe that the California Supreme Court erroneously extended constitutional
restraints to essentially nongovernmental action in Burrows v. Superior Court of San
Bernardino County, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974). This
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able to cite earlier cases that had committed essentially the same
error-treating governmental spying as though it were merely private
betrayal6 6-Miller compounded their error. In the earlier cases, law
enforcement officers had secured confidential information by deception; these cases therefore involved misplaced trust-a phenomenon
also found in cases of private betrayal-rather than the forced
disclosure of confidential information.
The Miller opinion advanced a number of arguments apart from
the argument that one who discloses information to another must
assume the risk of betrayal:
[T]he documents subpoenaed here are not respondent's "private
papers." . . . [R]espondent can assert neither ownership nor possession. Instead, these are the business records of the banks."
All of the documents obtained, including financial statements
and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to
the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course
of business."
By requiring that such records be kept by all banks, the Bank
Secrecy Act is not a novel means designed to circumvent established
Fourth Amendment rights. It is merely an attempt to facilitate the
use of a proper and longstanding law enforcement technique
by in69
suring that records are available when they are needed.
case not only concluded as a matter of state constitutional law that bank customers
have reasonable expectations of privacy in bank records; it also ruled that the state
constitution precludes banks from supplying these records to the government voluntarily unless the banks themselves claim to be victims of the customers' wrongdoing.
The court remarked irrelevantly that a bank could not "validly consent to an invasion of its depositors' rights." Id. at 245, 529 P.2d at 594, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
Of course I cannot validly consent to an invasion of my friend's rights, but if my
friend has trusted me with incriminating information, I can validly turn him in.
Bank officers may comply too readily with governmental requests for information, and the privacy of bank records may be insufficiently protected when these
requests are made and granted routinely. Nevertheless, legislation may be necessary
to protect against a bank's invasion of its customers' privacy in response to governmental requests. Despite extensive regulation, bank action is not governmental action,
and the constitution forbids neither governmental requests for information nor a private
entity's betrayal of confidences in response to these requests. See, e.g., United States
v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
66. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
751-52 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)).
67. Miller, 425 U.S. at 440.
68. Id. at 442.
69. Id. at 444.
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This article has offered as illustrations a number of bizarre
hypothetical cases that never could happen. Here is another. Acting
on White House orders, a group of people calling themselves
"plumbers" break into a psychiatrist's office without probable cause
or a warrant. They go through the psychiatrist's files, find one labeled
Ellsberg, take this file and leave. The' issue is whether an imaginary
patient named Ellsberg, whose confidences are contained in the file,
would have standing to contest the plumbers' unlawful seizure.
Virtually all of the Supreme Court's analysis in Miller would seem
equally applicable to this case. The psychiatrist had merely kept records
of transactions to which he himself was a party. Ellsberg had voluntarily conveyed personal information to this psychiatrist and thereby
had assumed the risk of betrayal. Moreover, the information was
exposed, not only to the psychiatrist, but to employees like the
psychiatrist's secretary in the ordinary course of business. If the government had required the psychiatrist to keep these records and disclose
them to the government, these requirements would have represented
no more than a proper and long-standing law enforcement techniqueinsuring that records were available when they were needed. Finally,
the records were not Ellsberg's private papers. He could claim neither
ownership nor possession.
A footnote to the Miller opinion seemed to advert to this kind
of case. It declared, "We do not address here the question of evidentiary privileges, such as that protecting communications between an
attorney and his client." 7 Nevertheless, many states do not recognize
a therapist-patient privilege,7" and although state law may provide some
evidence of prevailing sentiments concerning privacy, it cannot be determinative of federal constitutional rights. The case of a bank customer
is obviously distinguishable from the case of a psychiatric patient.
Nevertheless, if Ellsberg were afforded standing to challenge the seizure
of his psychiatrist's records, neither his voluntary sharing of information, nor his lack of ownership of the seized records, nor any of
the other circumstances emphasized in Miller could be regarded as
decisive.
Indeed, the government might go far toward 1984 simply by
extending recordkeeping and reporting requirements to ordinary
business relationships whose privacy has never been protected by
evidentiary privileges. Just as it may be useful for the government
70. Id. at 443 n.4.

71. See Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals:Lawyers and Psychiatrists,66

VA. L. REv. 547, 617 n.73 (1980); Note, Privacy inPersonal Medical Information:
A Diagnosis, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 394, 395 n.9 (1981).
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to learn what checks a person has written, it may be useful to learn
about his other financial transactions and the other aspects of his
life. Perhaps this person's secretary should be required to keep a record
of the work that the secretary does; perhaps his other employees, the
people who perform services in his home, the employer who knows
when he misses work, the bartender who knows how much he drinks,
the taxicab driver who drives him home after he consumes those drinks
in the tavern, and the department store clerk who knows what he
buys also should be required to keep records of his comings, goings
and doings; and perhaps all of these recordkeepers should be required
to make their records available to the government. Unless the Supreme
Court were to depart from the analysis offered in Miller, the fourth
amendment as understood by the Court apparently would say nothing
about this regime of almost total surveillance. In every instance, the
person asserting a privacy interest would have "take[n] the risk, in
revealing his affairs to another, that the information [would] be conveyed by that person to the government."
Of course, as the Supreme Court mentioned in Miller and emphasized in Schultz, recordkeeping and reporting requirements did not
originate with the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. In the absence of
statutory regulations, perhaps customers would expect gun dealers,
like bankers, to keep their business transactions confidential. Nevertheless, most people probably are not offended that gun dealers must
keep records of the guns that they buy,72 nor are they offended that
pharmacists must record and report their drug purchases73 and that
their employers must tell the Internal Revenue Service how much they
have been paid.7 ' Indeed, recordkeeping and reporting requirements
sometimes are extended to one highly confidential relationship whose
privacy is ordinarily protected by an evidentiary privilege. Doctors
sometimes are required to report, among other things, any treatment
that they provide for knife and gunshot wounds. 75 The Supreme Court
may have been concerned that contrary results in Schultz and Miller
would bring the downfall of many accepted recordkeeping and reporting requirements.
Nevertheless, plausible lines between and among recordkeeping
requirements can be drawn. One basic line is well established in current fourth amendment doctrine-the line between regulatory searches
and searches in aid of criminal investigations. A housing inspector
72.
73.
74.
75.

See, e.g., COLO.
See, e.g., id. §§
See Treas. Reg.
See, e.g., COLO.

REv. STAT. § 12-26-102 (1978).
12-22-318, 12-22-320 (Supp. 1982).
§ 31.6001 et seq. (1959).
REv. STAT. § 12-36-135 (Supp. 1982).
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need not have particular reason to suspect a violation of the building
code before entering a home; 6 a police officer investigating a crime
must have probable cause to believe that relevant evidence or a person to be arrested is within. On a similar theory, recordkeeping and
reporting requirements that serve bona fide regulatory purposes might
be differentiated from those designed primarily to aid the investigation of crime. 7"
Moreover, stronger expectations of privacy surround some interpersonal relationships than others; there is greater social utility in
protecting the privacy of some relationships than others; and there
is a stronger governmental need to limit the privacy of some relationships than others. The principal vice of Miller was that it disregarded
all of these potential distinctions in its rush to speak "in the large"
about the risks that a person must assume in virtually every situation
in which he shares information with others. The Court seemed to
swallow almost all issues of interpersonal privacy in one astonishing
gulp.
This view of the breadth of the Miller decision was confirmed
when the Supreme Court decided Smith v. Maryland three years
later. Smith involved the use of a device called a pen register-a device
that can be attached to a telephone line to record all telephone numbers
dialed by a user of that line. Smith apparently held that the fourth
amendment imposes no restrictions on the government's use of pen
registers, for a telephone user has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the numbers that he dials."'
Unlike Miller, in which a bank customer conveyed financial information to the employees of his bank, Smith may not have presented
an issue of interpersonal sharing at all. Although most of us realize
that long distance numbers are recorded for billing purposes (and
although our expectations of privacy concerning the resulting billing
records may be roughly comparable to our expectations of privacy
concerning bank records"0 ) Smith involved a local rather than a long
distance call. Ordinarily a person who dials a local call does not reveal
the numbers that he dials to telephone company employees. These
76. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

77. But see California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 76-77 (1974).
78. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
79. Id. at 742.

80. Most of us probably would be seriously offended if the telephone com-

pany published its billing records in a newspaper or revealed them to any busybody

who asked. But we probably also sense that the government sometimes can gain
access to the telephorie company's long distance records-for example, through the

use of a grand jury subpoena.
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numbers make electronic impressions on the telephone company's
equipment; they serve their purpose when the telephone on the other
end of the line rings; and, after that, they proceed into the void.
They usually are not recorded for any purpose. The Supreme Court
held in Smith that a person could sacrifice his expectations of privacy,
not only by conveying information to other people, but by conveying
information to machines. The Court wrote:
When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company and "exposed" that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so
doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal
to police the numbers he dialed. 8'
One wonders whether the Court's next step might be to hold that
a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy when he sings in
the shower because he voluntarily conveys his song to the soap dish
and shower curtain.
Perhaps, however, the relevant distinction is not between people
and machines but between people and machines that lack the capacity
to do what people do.8" The Supreme Court contended in Smith that
the telephone company's switching equipment was "merely the modern
counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber." 8 3 This statement seems incorrect. A
human operator is capable (although only in theory) of remembering
all the telephone numbers that he hears. The equipment to which a
telephone user conveys information when he places a local call
ordinarily lacks this capacity. The addition of a further piece of
equipment-namely, a pen register-is necessary to give the telephone
company's equipment the capacity of a human operator, and a person who places a local call ordinarily does not convey information
voluntarily to a pen register."
Moreover, even a ruling that one could have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information conveyed to a human operator
would be intolerable. Certainly a usual way of sending telegrams is
to dictate their contents to an operator; and despite the Supreme
Court's declarations in Smith, the Court probably would not hold
81. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.

82. Or, to be more precise, it is immaterial that someone conveys information
to a machine rather than to a person when he knows that the machine is merely
a link in a chain of communication and that it is recording the information for
later use by a person.
83. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
84. But see id. at 745.
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that the sender of a telegram has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in its contents and that, so far as the fourth amendment is concerned,
the government may obtain these contents without probable cause or
a warrant.
Indeed, a telephone user conveys the contents of his conversations to the telephone company's equipment in precisely the same way
that he conveys the numbers that he dials.8 5 The Supreme Court said
in Smith, "[A] pen register differs significantly from the listening device
employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of
communications." 86 Most of us undoubtedly would agree that the contents of our conversations are distinctly more private than the telephone
numbers that we dial. Nevertheless, in terms of the consideration that
the Court ultimately found determinative-the supposed voluntary
sharing of information-telephone numbers do not seem notably different from the contents of conversations that we "expose" to the
wires of the telephone company.
The Smith opinion generalized the principle that has seemed to
inform many recent Supreme Court decisions on interpersonal privacy
by saying, "This Court consistently has held that a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties." 8 7 The Court thus denied that the fourth amendment protects interpersonal privacy at all, but of course the Court
consistently has held no such thing. As mentioned earlier in this article, Katz itself protected the privacy of information that a defendant
conveyed voluntarily to a casual associate or confederate in crime.
Indeed, the error of the Court's statement becomes apparent when
we consider the fact that most of us do not live alone in our houses.
We voluntarily convey to our spouses, children, roommates and
guests-and even to the plumber, the landlord, and the person who
comes to clean-all sorts of information about our property and the
way we live. This voluntary sharing of information does not defeat
our reasonable expectation that the information that we have shared
85. The Court emphasized in Smith that "petitioner voluntarily conveyed to
[the phone company] information that it had facilities for recording and that it was
free to record." Id. at 745. Surely, however, the phone company has facilities for
recording the contents of telephone conversations; and although federal statutes currently restrict the recording of telephone conversations and not the recording of
telephone numbers, see United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977),
these statutes could be changed. Perhaps only Congress' good judgment keeps the
Supreme Court from using the analysis of Smith to uphold the warrantless governmental recording of telephone conversations.
86. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
87. Id. at 743-44.
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inside our houses will remain free from governmental intrusion. From
the very beginning, in its core protection of our persons, houses, papers
and effects, the fourth amendment has safeguarded our interpersonal
privacy.
One year before the sweeping statements of Smith, and two years
after the sweeping opinion in Miller, the Supreme Court decided a
case that illustrates the protection routinely afforded interpersonal
privacy by the fourth amendment. The issue in Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc.88 was whether a governmental officer could enter the business
premises of an electrical and plumbing contractor without a warrant
in order to inspect these premises for compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA). The government's brief
suggested that not only did the contractor's employees work in these
premises, but outside delivery people were admitted to them regularly. 9
The Court held that these circumstances neither defeated the contractor's justifiable expectations of privacy nor negated the need for a
search warrant. It said:
The critical fact in this case is that entry over Mr. Barlow's objection is being sought by a Government agent. Employees are not prohibited from reporting OSHA violations. What they observe in their
daily functions is undoubtedly beyond the employer's reasonable
expectations of privacy. The Government inspector, however, is not
an employee. Without a warrant he stands in no better position than
a member of the public. . . . That an employee is free to report,
and the Government is free to use, any evidence of noncompliance
with OSHA that the employee observes furnishes no justification
for federal agents to enter a place of business from which the public
is restricted and to conduct their own warrantless search. 90
The result of Barlow's was incompatible with the statement in
Smith "that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties," 9 ' and so was
the Supreme Court's suggestion that expectations of freedom from
governmental intrusion can be reasonable despite the absence of
expectations of privacy against substantial numbers of people unconnected with the government. Indeed, Barlow's indicates that the zone
of interpersonal privacy protected by the fourth amendment may be
88. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
89. Appellant's Brief at 29, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
See Grano, supra note 59, at 430. My analysis of Barlow's draws to a considerable
extent on Professor Grano's. Nevertheless, Professor Grano and I occasionally differ.
Compare id.at 435-36 with infra note 94.
90. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 314-15.
91. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
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large enough on some occasions to include dozens or hundreds of
people.
Plainly expectations of privacy were less intense in Barlow's than
in Rakas, Rawlings, Miller or Smith. In Smith, for example, it was
doubtful that the defendant had voluntarily shared information with
any individual at the telephone company; in Barlow's, the number
of employees and delivery people afforded access to the information
that the government sought was probably large. More importantly,
unlike the bank employees in Miller or the bailees in Rakas and
Rawlings, the employees in Barlow's almost certainly were not expected to keep working conditions (and most other things that they
observed while at work) confidential." In terms of reasonable expectations of privacy, the result of Barlow's seemed not only inconsistent with the other cases but backwards. Nevertheless, Professor
LaFave's observation that the decisions in Smith and Barlow's are
"irreconcilable" 9' 3 seems accurate only in terms of the rhetoric that
the Supreme Court employed. A plausible distinction-one resting on
pre-Katz visions of the fourth amendment rather than on differing
expectations of informational privacy-was not mentioned. In
Barlow's, unlike the other case, the warrantless search, if permitted,
would have involved a physical trespass upon an employer's property. This threatened physical trespass was almost certainly decisive."'
92. Moreover, if the employer in Barlow's had expected his employees to keep
whatever they saw confidential, his expectation would not have been supported by
general cultural sentiments; in that sense, it would have been "unreasonable."

93. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing
"Bright Lines" and "Good Faith", 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 311 (1982). See also

Grano, supra note 59, at 438-44.
94. It might not have been at all offensive for the Court to ground the result
in Barlow's primarily on the threatened physical trespass. As this article has contended, the fourth amendment protects both property and privacy. See supra text
accompanying notes 37-41. Indeed, I doubt that the employer in Barlow's-had an
interest in informational privacy that would have merited fourth amendment protection apart from his property interest. Contrary to the Court's suggestion in Barlow's,
the zone of interpersonal privacy protected by the fourth amendment is not really
large enough to accommodate hundreds of people. One can maintain plausibly that
expectations of privacy must be evaluated vis-a-vis the government-but only if one
recognizes that these expectations themselves are shaped by expectations of privacy
vis-a-vis people outside the government. See supra note 12. At least in cases in which
property interests are uninvolved, the fourth amendment creates no right to share
information with all the world save governmental officers. Under Katz, the decisive
inquiry when traditional property interests are absent is whether recognized cultural
sentiments support an expectation that certain information will remain private generally
(that is, secure from both accidental discovery and from discovery by a hypothetical

[1983:11

V.

INTERPERSONAL PRIVACY
THE INFORMANT SYSTEM AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The final portion of this article will indicate what the fourth
amendment might look like if the Supreme Court and other courts
began to take the Katz revolution seriously. The exercise may lead
in different and incompatible directions-for some, to greater respect
for Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Katz and for the view that
the fourth amendment protects only against the visual inspection and
seizure of tangible property; for others, to a newfound appreciation
of Miller and other recent cases that have held the line (even if incoherently) against the development of a fourth amendment concept
of interpersonal privacy; and for still others, to serious consideration
of an interpretation of the fourth amendment that initially might seem
strange and futuristic. The article suggests that post-Katz fourth amendment doctrine is poised on an untenable edge with slopes that descend
sharply in opposite directions. It develops this theme by focusing on
a discrete issue-whether the government's coercion of one person
(an informant) to reveal confidential information about another person (a suspect) is a "search" governed by fourth amendment standards.
So far as I can tell, this issue has never been litigated. The
reported cases do not indicate that any defense attorney has been bold
enough or foolhardy enough to argue that the coercion of one person simply to reveal another's secrets has invaded the second person's reasonable expectations of privacy. In some cases, defense
attorneys have objected that governmental evidence was derived from
an unlawfully obtained confession by a person who implicated the
defendant. Nevertheless, they have argued only that the coercion of
this confession violated the informant's privilege against selfincrimination, not that it violated the defendant's fourth amendment
rights. The courts, applying clearly established doctrine, have held
that a defendant lacks standing to object to the violation of another
"nosy stranger" using lawful, generally available and generally accepted investigative
techniques).
Although I have argued that the fourth amendment safeguards property as well
as privacy, I recognize that judicial decisions have declined to afford fourth amendment protection to minor property interests that are unaccompanied by privacy interests. Most notably, both before and after Katz, the Supreme Court has permitted
governmental officers to trespass on "open fields" without probable cause and without
judicial authorization. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Air Pollution
Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974). See also Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion). Whatever the merits of these decisions, the employer's property interest in Barlow's was substantial, and it was alloyed
to a limited extent with a privacy interest.
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person's fifth amendment privilege."'
Analysis of the distinct fourth amendment issue can begin with

two cases. In both cases the police suspect, on the basis of little

evidence, that Sandra Snort is a cocaine dealer. They do not have
probable cause for a search of Sandra's residence, and they do not
have a search warrant. In both cases, the police knock on the door
of Sandra's residence and discover that only her husband Simon is
at home.
In Case One, the police ask Simon to permit a search of the
residence, and he refuses. After the police threaten to break both of
Simon's knees, however, he relents; and the police discover on Sandra's
dresser a jar containing prohibited drugs. Although the officers' coercive threat was directed to Simon, not to Sandra, Sandra clearly has
standing to object that Simon's consent was involuntary and the search
invalid.16 Sandra had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her

residence, and a police search that invaded this privacy required affirmative justification. Probable cause coupled with a search warrant
would have supplied this justification; and because Simon was a coowner and occupant of the residence, his voluntary consent would
have supplied appropriate justification as well." Nevertheless, Simon's
95. E.g., United States v. Burton, 416 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1014 (1970); United States v. Howell, 470 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1972).
96. See, e.g., Bumpers v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 & n.11 (1968).
97. This, at least, is the conventional explanation. Rather than speak in terms
of a third party's consent as justification for a search, however, it might be better
simply to emphasize that the fourth amendment is inapplicable to nongovernmental
activity. When an invasion of privacy seems primarily the product of betrayal by
a private individual, it may not implicate the fourth amendment despite some governmental involvement. See supra note 64. Admittedly, however, the level of governmental involvement necessary to implicate the fourth amendment varies with the circumstances. For example, when a private individual lacks "authority" to consent
to a search, almost any governmental involvement in a search that this individual
has purportedly authorized usually will be sufficient.
Perhaps the Supreme Court has gone astray in interpersonal privacy cases partly
because it has focused on expectations of privacy and on the justification for searches
when it should have focused on the presence or absence of adequate governmental
action. One sentiment appears to run through interpersonal privacy cases in a variety of contexts: So long as an invasion of privacy is primarily the product of private
betrayal rather than of intrusive governmental action, it does not violate the fourth
amendment. A court might attempt to capture this sentiment in any of three doctrinal propositions:
1) Inadequate governmental action. Constitutional limitations are inapplicable

to an invasion of privacy that, despite some degree of governmental involvement, is primarily the product of betrayal by a private individual who
has been entrusted by another private individual with information or
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involuntary acquiescence is not consent; it counts for nothing. Sandra
has the same power to challenge the search as if the police had entered

without asking.

property.
2) Lack of any reasonable expectation of privacy. A person who entrusts
another with information or property assumes the risk of betrayal and
therefore has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information or
property that he has shared. The problem is not that the governmental action
is inadequate; rather, it is that the government's action does not amount
to a "search" under fourth amendment standards..
3) "Reasonableness" of the governmental search. Any significant governmental involvement in a breach of privacy is subject to constitutional limitations; and when a person whose privacy has been invaded had a reasonable
expectation that the information acquired by the government would remain
private, this governmental action does amount to a "search." Nevertheless,
so long as the breach of privacy is primarily the result of private betrayal
rather than of forcible, coercive or deceptive action on the part of the government, the "search" is reasonable and does not violate the fourth amendment.
All of these doctrinal formulations seem subject to criticism. As this footnote
has noted, the first (focusing on the lack of sufficient governmental action) treats
the government's involvement in a breach of privacy as insufficient to invoke constitutional limitations although the same involvement would be sufficient in other
contexts. Moreover, in determining the applicability of constitutional limitations, courts
ordinarily do not ask whether the government bears "primary" responsibility for
an invasion of constitutionally protected interests; instead, they are satisfied with
any "significant" government involvement. E.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). Nevertheless, the sense that private betrayal
should not violate the fourth amendment despite a degree of governmental involvement appears to be primarily a "governmental action" sentiment, and the doctrinal
difficulties posed by this formulation seem less serious than those posed by the
alternatives.
This article already has noted the deficiencies of the second formulation-the
one most often endorsed by the Supreme Court. See text supra at notes 87-88. It
is not true that any sharing of information or property that incurs some risk of
betrayal marks the end of ordinary cultural expectations of privacy in the information or property. Thus, although the defendant in Katz voluntarily shared information with a person who might have betrayed him, the Supreme Court held that the
electronic surveillance of his conversation "violated the privacy upon which he
justifiably relied." 389 U.S. at 353. Moreover, a person who voluntarily shares information inside his home and thereby incurs some risk of betrayal surely does not
lose all reasonable expectation of privacy in this information.
The third formulation (focusing on the "reasonableness" of the government's
action) also seems troublesome; it sweeps aside the framework that the fourth amendment establishes for judging the reasonableness of a search. When governmental action
is responsible for the defeat of a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore
qualifies as a search, the text of the amendment suggests that the government must
have evidentiary justification for the intrusion. In addition, government officers
ordinarily must secure judicial approval of this intrusion in advance. Threshold tests
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In Case Two, rather than ask Simon to consent to a search, the
police ask him directly whether Sandra is a cocaine dealer. Simon
again refuses to cooperate until the police threaten to break his knees.
Then he admits that Sandra is a dealer and that she keeps her drugs
in a jar on the dresser. This information, coupled with some confirmatory detail that Simon provides and with the evidence that the police
possessed at the outset, establishes probable cause for a search. The
police obtain a search warrant, enter the residence and seize the drugs.
A constitutional rule that treated these cases differently would
be incoherent. In both cases, the police used essentially the same
methods to accomplish the same invasion of Sandra's privacy. Nevertheless, in Case Two, it was not the visual search or physical seizure,
both of which were supported by probable cause and authorized by
a warrant, that violated Sandra's fourth amendment rights. If any
fourth amendment violation occurred, it occurred when the police
forced Simon to talk. This police action would have defeated Sandra's
legitimate expectations of privacy and would have violated the fourth
amendment even had the subsequent visual inspection and physical
seizure not occurred. 9
for distinguishing governmental from private action and for distinguishing searches
from other governmental action become useful only if, once the thresholds have been
crossed, established fourth amendment standards can be used to determine the
lawfulness of the government's searches. The model of legality established by the
fourth amendment centers on the probable cause and warrant requirements, and these
requirements should not be cast aside whenever the government's role seems
"reasonable" in the abstract.
I am aware of only one Supreme Court decision that has treated the problem
of "third party consent" primarily as a problem of inadequate governmental action.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court described the issue
as whether the defendant's spouse "must be regarded as having acted as an 'instrument' or agent of the state when she produced her husband's belongings." Id.
at 487. Although the court recognized that "there no doubt always exist forces
pushing the spouse to cooperate with the police," id. at 487-88, it emphasized the
absence of any "attempt on [the] part [of the police] to coerce or dominate her,
or, for that matter, to direct her actions by the more subtle techniques of suggestion
that are available to officials in circumstances like these." Id. at 489. Without denying that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the clothing that
his spouse delivered to the police, the Court concluded that no governmental search
or seizure had occurred.
98. Sandra might have a plausible nonconstitutional objection to the admission of the drugs in Case Two-that any physical evidence "derived" from a confidential interspousal communication falls within the common law evidentiary privilege
for the communication itself. Cf. People v. Dubanowski, 75 Ill. App. 3d 809, 394
N.E.2d 605 (1979) (privilege applies to testimony of third party who overheard one
spouse's communication with other spouse's voluntary consent).
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The argument that the coercion of Simon violated Sandra's fourth
amendment rights can be made in other ways. If, for example, this
article has persuaded you that Miller, the bank records case, was
wrongly decided, you might consider in greater detail the constitutional evil that the case presented. I believe it was nothing more than
the coercion of a bank to reveal information that it had received in
confidence-the same evil that was presented when the police pressured
Simon to talk. Certainly the two cases cannot be distinguished on
the ground that expectations of privacy are more intense in the relationship between a bank and its customer than in the relationship
between a husband and wife.
Of course one's initial response to Miller might be influenced
by the fact that the case did involve a seizure of tangible bank records.
As the Supreme Court observed, however, these records were not the
defendant's property but the bank's. The defendant's claim accordingly rested, not on any governmental abrogation of his property rights,
but on a governmental invasion of his privacy. Surely, if a government officer had visited the bank and had required bank officers to
allow him to read the records without seizing them, the invasion of
the defendant's privacy would have been no less offensive. If the
government's seizure of the records in Miller had been held to violate
the defendant's fourth amendment rights, a visual search of the records
undoubtedly would have violated his rights as well. The government
might have avoided a visual inspection of the records, however, by
forcing a bank officer to read the records aloud; or the government
might have forced a bank employee to reveal the information that
the records contained without a verbatim reading. In all of these cases,
the invasion of the defendant's privacy would have been identical,
and Katz teaches that it is this invasion of privacy that triggers fourth
amendment protections, not whether the invasion has been
accomplished by a law enforcement officer's sense of sight or by his
sense of hearing. If the Supreme Court had reached a contrary result
in Miller, it could not, consistently with Katz, have stopped short
of holding that the coercion of one person to reveal orally information previously given to him in confidence by another does sometimes
violate the fourth amendment.
Recognition of this possibly startling fact might lead to some
begrudging respect for Miller even on the part of people seriously
offended by that decision. Miller may be incompatible with the ruling
in Barlow's and with many other decisions; it may depend ultimately
upon a transparent confounding of governmental coercion and private
betrayal; it may disregard cultural expectations of privacy that seem
almost indisputable; and it may authorize a terrifying regime of
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surveillance by banks, bartenders, and secretaries who have been impressed into governmental service. Nevertheless, if the Supreme Court
were to slide from the untenable edge in the opposite direction, where
would the slippery slope reach bottom?
Current law enforcement practices depend heavily on pressuring
people to reveal confidential information about others. For example,
police officers and prosecutors sometimes insure the pretrial detention of potential informants until they agree to cooperate. These officers commonly threaten informants with conviction and imprisonment on charges that will be abandoned if the informants provide
evidence against others. It is not unusual for law enforcement officers
to threaten the arrest and prosecution of the informant's friends,
relatives, lovers, and associates. Police officers sometimes promise
falsely that an informant's statements will be used only for limited
purposes or that only limited disclosures will be required. And after
an informant has provided some information (and perhaps even when
he has not), the officers may threaten to expose his cooperation. Professor Alan M. Dershowitz has offered a dramatic illustration-a case
in which police officers and prosecutors employed almost all of these
tactics as well as a small threat of murder:
Parola [a police officer] turned away and began to open the trunk
of his car. Seigel [a potential informant] watched with anticipation
as he removed a shovel. "What are you going to do with that,"
Seigel asked, "plant a tree for Israel?"
Parola wasn't smiling. "No, you wise-ass prick, we're gonna
plant you .... We're gonna do to you what we used to do to
pushers when we were in narcotics. How do you think we got them
off the street? Not through the courts, you can bet your ass." 99
The informant system remains a dark corner of law enforcement
that is all but immune from judicial control under the Bill of Rights
and other constitutional, statutory and judicially created restraints on
governmental conduct. 100 Whenever the government seeks evidence
from one person for use solely against another, current notions of
99. A. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 26 (1982).

100. Courts subject the informant system to some minimal, indirect and largely
ineffectual control when they rule on such questions as whether an informant's
statements supply probable cause for a conventional search, whether an informant's
conduct toward a suspect constitutes entrapment, whether an informant has a "law
enforcement privilege" to engage in conduct that otherwise would be criminal, and
whether an informant's identity is privileged from disclosure at a judicial hearing.
See generally Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and
Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951).
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substantive fourth amendment protections coupled with current notions
of standing seem to say that anything goes.''
Of course the creation of informants and their use to invade
privacy often may be necessary; even the unseemly tactics that Dershowitz reported had a critically important law enforcement goalthe exposure of a group of terrorists whose bombings already had
killed and whose homicidal activities were continuing. Nevertheless,
the same privacy-invading tactics can be used for less compelling
reasons. The fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches
is sufficiently flexible to permit a just accommodation of the needs
of law enforcement and the protection of individual privacy. This
article will indicate some lines that might be drawn. Still, recognition
that the fourth amendment sometimes prohibits the government from
forcing one person to reveal another's confidences would lead the
courts into an uncharted and difficult area, and one therefore may
sympathize with cases like Miller and Smith that view the precipice
and say in effect, "We won't go."
As I have noted, a construction of the fourth amendment that
would prohibit the coercion of Simon to reveal Sandra's secrets initially may seem strange. Nevertheless, the initial sense of strangeness
may dissipate when some reasons for it are examined.
Forced verbal disclosure may not appear to implicate the fourth
amendment partly because we have never thought of the coercion of
a suspect to reveal his own secrets as a "search." The reason for
this conceptualization of the coercion of a suspect's own statements,
however, is simple: In this context, we need not face any fourth amendment issue. When law enforcement officers pressure a suspect to talk,
the fifth amendment says all that the fourth amendment might say
and more. The privilege against self-incrimination is unqualified; unlike
the freedom from searches and seizures, it cannot be overcome by
demonstrating probable cause for a governmental intrusion. Had our
Constitution contained no privilege against self-incrimination (and no
"due process" prohibition of coerced confessions), we might have
been much quicker to recognize the fourth amendment implications
of forced verbal disclosures."'

said:

101. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
102. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 633 (1886), the Supreme Court
[A]ny forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of

his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to
forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of [the constitutional] judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into
each other.
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Although the fifth amendment's protection of a suspect's privacy

is broader than the fourth amendment's in one respect, it is narrower
in another. The privilege against self-incrimination never protects interpersonal privacy. It is a privilege not to incriminate oneself, not

a privilege to be free of incrimination by others. When a person entrusts information or property to another (even an attorney, spouse,
doctor, or priest), the fifth amendment does not prevent the forced
disclosure of this shared information or property by the confidant." °
The fifth amendment, in other words, frees Sandra from compulsion
to incriminate Sandra; it does not restrict the compulsion of Simon
to incriminate Sandra. Any constitutional limitation on the govern-

ment's compulsion of Simon to incriminate Sandra must be sought
in the fourth amendment.
Perhaps, however, this limitation cannot be found. A second and
more serious objection to a construction of the fourth amendment
that would protect Sandra from the privacy-invading coercion of her

husband is that this coercion simply does not appear to be what the
framers of the fourth amendment had in mind when they used the
word "search."

[The two amendments] throw great light on each other. For the
"unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment
are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence
against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on
the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have been unable to perceive
that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence
against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness
against himself.
See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (Black, J., concurring). But see
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
103. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). Controversy about the
zone of privacy protected by the fifth amendment tends to focus on a relatively
narrow issue-whether information that a person has recorded in a document should
be treated in the same manner as information that he has retained in his memory
or instead in the same manner as information that he has shared with other people.
Indeed, the Supreme Court currently appears to treat the sharing of information
with a piece of paper (a personal diary for example) no differently than the sharing
of this information with a human being. The fifth amendment sometimes affords
a privilege not to produce a voluntarily written document, but only because producing the document would "authenticate" it and thereby reveal incriminating information retained in the memory of the producing party and not recorded in the document itself. See id.
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Some constitutional law scholars called "noninterpretivists" have
declared boldly that their "different experience of life in our polity"
entitles them to re-invent constitutional doctrine without significant
regard for the text of the Constitution, its history or its objects.'10
It is not necessary to join this band of constitutional Robin Hoods
to accept some wisdom that Chief Justice Marshall told "interpretivists" never to forget: "[I]t is a constitution we are expounding.'""'
A penal statute must give precise warning of what it prohibits and must
be narrowly construed to reach only the evils that its language unmistakably proscribes, but the fourth amendment is not a penal statute.
The framers of the fourth amendment probably had a specific
evil in mind when they prohibited unreasonable searches, and this
evil was not the coercion of Simon to talk about Sandra. It was instead the visual inspection of a home or business for goods on which
duties had not been paid by a customs officer armed with a document called a writ of assistance. Nevertheless, in proscribing this evil,
the framers used broad and general language, and the evil that
prompted their action does not mark the limits of constitutional protection. No one would suggest, for example, that the fourth amendment reaches only searches by customs officers.'0 6
Katz in fact held that the constitutional term "search" is not
confined to visual inspections, and I believe that this ruling was correct. Simply as a linguistic matter, the word search commonly is used
as a synonym for the word investigate. For example, this article has
been engaged in a search for appropriate constitutional principles concerning the protection of interpersonal privacy, and even without a
lantern one may search for an honest man. One may regard this usage
as metaphorical if he likes, but I believe and the dictionaries confirm' 7
that, whatever its origins, the usage now reflects at least a second
meaning and perhaps even the primary meaning of the word search.
Moreover, this broader use of the word search arose long before the
104. E.g., Parker, The Past of ConstitutionalTheory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO
ST. L.J. 223 (1981).
105. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
106. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) ("a principle
to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth"); Amsterdam, supra note 65, at 399 ("To suppose [that the framers] meant
to preserve to their posterity by guarantees of liberty written with the broadest latitude
nothing more than hedges against the recurrence of particular forms of evils suffered at the hands of a monarchy beyond the seas seems . . . implausible in the
extreme.").
107. E.g., WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED

2257 (2d ed. 1934).
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fourth amendment was written. Chaucer said that no man could sufficiently comprehend nor search the Lord God;'10 the King James version of the Bible included the psalm, "0 Lord, thou hast searched
me and known me";'09 Shakespeare inquired "if zealous love should
go in search of virtue";" ' Milton proclaimed, "Now clear I under111
stand what oft my steadiest thoughts have searched in vain";
and John Locke spoke of those "who seriously search after . . .
truth.'"" 2 Noah Webster's first dictionary, published in 1828, defined
the word search in part as "to inquire, to seek for. [A] quest [or]
pursuit."' 3 Samuel Johnson's earlier, pre-fourth-amendment work had
used almost identical language.'" Without contending that the fourth
amendment governs all searches for truth and virtue, one may recognize
that it encompasses more than visual inspections.
In seeking (or searching for) the meaning of the fourth amendment, one relevant principle of construction is that the framers did
not intend this law to be an ass. The process of construing a law
in light of its apparent purpose undoubtedly can be misused and
sometimes can degenerate into an idle word game. It is fallacious,
for example, to assert that because the framers of the Constitution
protected privacy in one way or in several ways, they must have intended to protect privacy in other ways."' Nevertheless, when a proposed construction of the fourth amendment would yield results that
almost everyone would find incongruous, that construction probably
ought to be avoided. It is reasonable to accord to the framers of
the fourth amendment a presumption of sanity.
As Justice Brandeis noted long ago, construing the word "search"
in the fourth amendment to refer only to the process of visual inspection would yield manifestly incongruous results.' 6 Under this construction, a blind police officer could never violate the amendment.
108. G. CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES: THE TALE OF MELIBEUS § 38 (1477),
reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF CHAUCER 222 (2d ed. Oxford 1904).
109. Psalms 139:1 (King James).
110. W. SHAKESPEARE, KING JOHN act III, scene 1, line 428 (1590), reprinted
in THE ARDEN SHAKESPEARE, KING JOHN 44 (4th ed. 1975).
Ill. J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST book 12, lines 376-77 (2d ed. 1674), reprinted
in J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST 274 (Elledge ed. 1975).
112. Quoted in annotations to the word "search" in 2 S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London 1755) (unpaginated).
113. 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)
(unpaginated).
114. 2 S. JOHNSON, supra note 112.
115. But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
116. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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If, however, courts recognized that a blind officer could violate the
amendment by feeling for a gun or by sniffing for marijuana, it would
be difficult for these courts to hold that an officer could never violate
the amendment by using his sense of hearing. The Supreme Court
declared more than a century ago that the fourth amendment prevents
the government from opening and reading letters in the mail without
judicial authorization. ' 7 In an era when the telephone has become a more
common medium of long distance communication than the mails, it would
be incongruous to hold the fourth amendment inapplicable to the interception of telephonic communications. This interception involves, not
merely an evil somewhat comparable to that presented by an interception of letters, but the same evil. If the fourth amendment were to
permit one and forbid the other, the law would be an ass. ' 8
Although the application of the fourth amendment to wiretapping
no longer seems controversial, I have belabored the justification for
this interpretation because the same process of construction supports
the view that the police violate the fourth amendment when they coerce
Simon Snort to reveal his wife's confidences. As noted at the outset
of this discussion, it would violate Sandra's fourth amendment rights
for the police to force Simon to consent to a visual search of their
residence. When the police can avoid the bother of this visual inspection by forcing Simon to reveal exactly the same information about
Sandra and the jar on her dresser that the visual inspection would
reveal, the same evil is presented. Although Simon's oral evidence
might not be of the same quality as the evidence produced by the
visual inspection, the police would have gained the same personal information about Sandra-information that, under the fourth amendment, they had no right to discover through an invasion of her privacy
in the absence of probable cause. The police would forcibly have
substituted Simon's eyes for their own. This point is underscored by
the fact that the information that Simon conveys orally can establish
probable cause for the visual inspection itself. If the fourth amendment were to block one route to Sandra's dresser but leave the other
open, the law would be an ass.
In any event, the die may have been cast when the Supreme Court
decided Katz. Of course the bridge still may be open if the current
Court wishes to retreat. Nevertheless, the Court's goal must be to
give the fourth amendment a coherent meaning. The word search can
be defined plausibly to refer only to the process of visual inspection.
If that definition is rejected, no stopping point short of construing
117. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (dictum).
118. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475-76 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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the term to encompass all privacy-invading criminal investigations seems
apparent. Under this broader definition, the one that Katz seemed
to endorse, the coercion of Simon to reveal Sandra's confidences apparently qualifies as a "search." To reject this conclusion without
overruling Katz is to leave fourth amendment law teetering on that
untenable edge.
Of course one might be reluctant to endorse a "functionalist"
interpretation of the fourth amendment if there were reason to believe
that the authors of the amendment would reject it themselves. Unlike
wiretapping, the coercion of informants is not the product of a
sophisticated technology of which the framers were unaware, for
kneecaps were as vulnerable in 1791 as they are today. One might
argue that the framers of the fourth amendment would have used
different language had they intended to subject the informant system
to judicial control.
At the time that the fourth amendment was written, however,
the informant system was subject to a stricter judicial control than
the application of fourth amendment principles would require. Professional police forces were unknown.' 9 Even the enforcement of laws
against "victimless" crime apparently depended primarily upon private
complaints. Today's extensive networks of informants-networks built
and maintained by police pressures that sometimes seem limited only
by police inventiveness-were not a significantly more important part
of the experience of the framers than was wiretapping.'
Of course, even in 1791, law enforcement sometimes required
the use of evidence and information supplied by criminals. A formal,
judicially controlled system for obtaining and using this evidence had
119. See, e.g., R.
120. 2 T.

LANE, POuCING THE CITY-BOSTON

1822-1885, at 1 (1967).

MAY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND SINCE THE ACCES-

THIRD 1760-1860, at 275-79 (1899), describes a small number
of cases in England just prior to and shortly after the adoption of the fourth amendment that involved the use of undercover agents. The work does not indicate, however,
that any of these agents had been subjected to the sort of governmental pressure
that this article has argued may violate fourth amendment principles. May introduced
his description of these apparently exceptional cases by saying:
Nothing is more revolting to Englishmen than the espionage which forms
part of the administrative system of continental despotisms. It haunts men
like an evil genius, chills their gayety, restrains their wit, casts a shadow
over their friendships, and blights their domestic hearth. The freedom of
a country may be measured by its immunity from this baleful agency ....
Our own countrymen have been comparatively exempt from this
hateful interference with their moral freedom. Yet we find many traces of
SION OF GEORGE THE

a system repugnant to the liberal policy of our laws.
Id.at 275-76.
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developed. The origins of this system lay in the early common law
practice of approvement. In the early days of the common law, an
accused felon might confess his guilt and offer to "appeal"-or bring
a private prosecution-against other participants in the crime with
which he was charged.'' A judge then would balance the benefits
of the proposed prosecution against the danger of pardoning the
accused; for if the defendant were successful in his appeal, he would
be entitled automatically to a pardon. Sir Matthew Hale noted that
to become an approver
a judge's decision to accept a defendant's offer
22
was "a matter of grace and discretion."'
The practice of approvement had fallen into disuse before the
adoption of the fourth amendment,' 2 3 but judges regarded this practice as "very material""' in shaping a closely related form of bargaining for accomplice testimony that persisted into the late nineteenth
century. Informants no longer were required to bring private prosecutions or to secure the judicial condemnation of their confederates,
but whenever a felon was permitted to testify against his accomplices,
he gained "an equitable title" to an executive pardon. 25 The courts
therefore refused to allow an offender to testify against less culpable
accomplices, and they also forbade prosecutors from bargaining for
testimony. They said that the power to grant leniency in exchange
for information was "by its nature a judicial power."' 2 6 In effect,
the courts found "probable cause," or a sufficient law enforcement
reason, for every lawful use of an informant; and rather than improvise the leverage that might be used to secure his testimony, they
insisted in every case on a formal grant of immunity. This immunity
took the form of an executive pardon for a specified past offense.
Under the controlled process of securing accomplice testimony that
existed in 1791, the government did not supply a de facto license to
engage in criminal activity in the future; it did not promise to forego
the prosecution of friends and relatives; it did not offer false assurances
121. See 2 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 226-35 (S. Emlyn
ed. London 1736). This article's discussion of the early informant system has been
derived with minor modification from Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14-16 (1979). See also Donnelly, supra note 100, at 1091.
122. 2 M. HALE, supra note 121, at 226.
123. Id.; Rex v. Rudd, 1 Cowp. 331, 334, 98 Eng. Rep. 1114, 1116 (K.B. 1775)
(Mansfield, J.).
124. Rex v. Rudd, 1 Cowp. at 335, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1116.
125. Id. at 334, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1116; People v. Whipple, 9 Cow. 707, 711
(N.Y. 1827); Camron v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 180, 22 S.W. 682 (Crim. App. 1893).
126. People v. Whipple, 9 Cow. at 712; see United States v. Lee, 26 F. Cas.
910 (D. Ill. 1846) (No. 15,588); Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 348 (1878).
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of confidentiality, or false assurances of seeking only limited disclosure,
or false assurances of using disclosures only for limited purposes; and
it apparently did not threaten the "planting" without trial of people
27
who refused to inform.1
Of course it cannot reasonably be maintained that the framers
of the Constitution specifically intended the fourth amendment to
perpetuate judicial control of the informant system. Equally, however,
it cannot fairly be maintained that this use of the amendment would
be incompatible with practices that the framers knew and accepted.
If the framers had in mind general warrants rather than the coercion
of informants when they wrote the fourth amendment, the reason
may have been that general warrants had been used to invade privacy
without probable cause in a way that informants had not.' 28 Application of the fourth amendment to the coercion of informants might
in fact lead to an informant system reminiscent of the one that existed
in 1791; it would, however, be a system less restrictive of law enforcement interests.
If the informant system were subjected to judicial control under
the fourth amendment, what shape would it take? Could courts avoid
a crash landing at the bottom of the slippery slope, or might application of the fourth amendment to the coercion of verbal information
mark the end of any effective use of informants? A number of poten127. Apart from the procedures described in the text, an antecedent of today's
informant system can be found in relatively early English statutes that proscribed
new offenses (usually of a commercial nature) and that permitted informants to recover
a portion of the fines collected for violation of these statutes. See 4 W. HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 355-58 (2d ed. 1937). Again, the reward that the government provided for information was measured and regulated. Nevertheless, statutory
procedures for rewarding informants apparently were abused and resented. See E.
COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE *194.
128. How at least some of the framers might have viewed today's informant
system is suggested by Livingston's speech against the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1789:
The system of espionage thus established, the country will swarm with informers, spies, delators, and all that odious reptile tribe that breed in the
sunshine of despotic power; that suck the blood of the unfortunate, and
creep into the bosom of sleeping innocence, only to awake it with a burning wound. The hours of the most unsuspecting confidence, the intimacies
of friendship, or the recesses of domestic retirement, afford no security.
The companion whom you must trust, the friend in whom you must confide, the domestic who waits in your chamber, are all tempted to betray
your imprudence or unguarded follies; to misrepresent your words; to convey them, distorted by calumny, to the secret tribunal where jealousy
presides-where fear officiates as accuser, and suspicion is the only evidence
that is heard.

8

ANNALS OF CONG.

2014 (1798) (5th Cong., 2d Sess.).
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tial distinctions merit consideration.
Although the justification for conventional searches almost invariably must be assessed on a case-by-case basis; the informant system
presents recurrent situations that might be subjected to different forms
of control. For example, when a person is found in possession of
unlawful drugs, there is always probable- cause to believe that he had
a supplier. Probable cause might prove a doubtful question in other
situations in which the government wished to "turn" an informant,
but different fourth amendment issues would be likely to prove significant in most drug cases.
The critical issue when the police arrest a drug user might be
what methods they could use to obtain his disclosures rather than
whether probable cause for obtaining these disclosures exists. In conducting a conventional search, the police ordinarily must knock and
announce their purpose; and if, without knocking, they drive a
bulldozer through the wall, their search becomes unlawful despite the
fact that it was supported by probable cause and authorized by a
warrant. 29 Similarly, courts might hold it unlawful for the police to
obtain an informant's statements by using a bulldozer. These courts
also might draw a line between standardized promises of leniency and
threats to prosecute friends and relatives.
Moreover, in some conventional fourth amendment situations,
the Supreme Court has indicated that an "area warrant"-a search
warrant that authorizes invasions of privacy in a series of cases rather
than one-may satisfy the purposes of the amendment. 3 ' Rather than
require magistrates to pass upon probable cause in innumerable drug
cases in which probable cause does not seem likely to be an issue,
perhaps courts could issue warrants akin to "area warrants" that would
specify permissible police procedures for entire classes of cases.
Perhaps, too, statutory determinations of probable cause in certain
recurrent situations coupled with statutory specifications of appropriate
procedures for these situations could serve the purposes ordinarily
served by a judicial warrant. 3 '
These suggestions indicate the flexibility of the fourth amendment in cases in which courts determine that police activity amounts
129. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). Similarly, the Supreme Court
has indicated that the use of brutal or unreasonable methods to obtain a blood sample might violate the fourth amendment despite the existence of both probable cause
and circumstances justifying the lack of a judicial warrant. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 n.3 (1975).
131. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981).
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to a "search." Nevertheless, courts might treat the forced disclosure
of confidential information as a "search" in some situations and not
in others. A critical issue would be the legitimacy of a suspect's
expectations of privacy in his relationship with an informant. When
Sandra Snort shared information with her husband, her expectations
of privacy plainly were supported by strong cultural sentiments."3 2
Were a drug dealer to share confidential information with a customer
whom he had not met five minutes before, a court might conclude
that the dealer had no legitimate expectation of privacy.
Of course the classification of many interpersonal relationships
might prove difficult. If Sandra and Simon had shared a home for
a decade or more but had not been married, would Sandra's expectations of privacy have been significantly less reasonable? If not, could
courts effectively distinguish between the long-term relationship of
Sandra and Simon and an intimate relationship of lesser duration?
Surely a drug dealer should not be invited to "buy" constitutional
protection by insisting that his customers have sex with him.
Moreover, if expectations of privacy are sufficiently intense in
most friendships to justify constitutional protection, courts might not
find it worth the effort to try to distinguish these friendships from
mere acquaintanceships. The police are not likely to know the exact
relationship between a suspect and an informant at the time that they
seek the informant's story. Because only the suspect and the informant may know the history of this relationship in detail, the suspect,
the informant or both often might attempt to "color" the character
of the relationship after the fact. These considerations might lead the
courts either to extend the protection of the fourth amendment broadly
to all situations in which the government forces the disclosure of confidential information or to confine this protection narrowly to welldefined relationships of confidentiality (husband and wife, parent and
child, therapist and patient, bank and customer, or whatever).' 33 In
132. These cultural sentiments are indicated, for example, by the long-standing
evidentiary privilege for interspousal communications. See 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
§§ 2332-2341 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
133. This article has argued that a person sometimes can retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in information shared with a confidant just as he can retain
a reasonable expectation of privacy in property placed inside a container. Elaborate
judicial efforts to distinguish certain confidential relationships from others might prove
reminiscent of recent efforts to distinguish "worthy" from "unworthy" containers.
In one Dickensian effort, a Supreme Court Justice proposed that closed containers
be divided into three categories. Containers like personal luggage, he said, are "inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy." Containers like plastic cups and
grocery sacks invariably lack this association. Finally, containers like cardboard boxes
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light of the current failure to protect suspects against the coercion
of verbal disclosures by people in whom they have confided, even
this narrow protection would mark a significant advance in the
safeguarding of interpersonal privacy.
Moreover, application of the fourth amendment to the coercion
of verbal disclosures obviously would require courts to draw a line
between this coercion and other activities that still would not qualify
as "searches." If promises of leniency were held noncoercive, for
example, much of today's informant system might remain unaffected
by a judicial determination that the fourth amendment sometimes
restricts an informant's forced disclosures.
My own view, to be sure, is that promises of leniency are sufficiently coercive to implicate the fourth amendment. Indeed, although
this article has borrowed the terminology customarily employed in
cases of third-party consent and has spoken of voluntariness and coercion, this language is somewhat misleading. If law enforcement officers
were to offer Simon $10,000 to permit a search of his and Sandra's
bedroom, Simon's decision to accept this wealth and to permit the
search might not seem involuntary from his perspective. I believe,
however, that the search would violate Sandra's fourth amendment
rights. The critical issue would not be the voluntariness of Simon's
consent but whether the invasion of Sandra's privacy without probable cause was attributable primarily to intrusive governmental action
rather than to the betrayal of one spouse by another. Similarly,
although courts have held that an offer of leniency in plea bargaining does not render a guilty plea involuntary,' 34 an offer of leniency
to an informant might be sufficient to make his disclosures chiefly
the product of intrusive governmental action.
Courts might reject these views concerning the significance of
promises of leniency and still subject the most offensive aspects of
today's informant system to judicial control. A gradual process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion could give greater coherency to the
fourth amendment's protection of interpersonal privacy than today's
inconsistent application of broad rhetoric concerning the risks of twoparty relationships.
and laundry bags are "ambiguous containers." When confronted with an "ambiguous
container," a court must conduct a hearing on various issues including the container's
"size, shape, material, and condition." Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 434
n.3 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). The principal opinion in Robbins
rejected this approach, as did the Supreme Court decision that overruled Robbins
one year later. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
134. E.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
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The complexity of these issues might lead one to hesitate before
endorsing even a limited use of the fourth amendment to control the
informant system. Indeed, one might conclude that the hero of this
article is not Justice Stewart, the author of the Supreme Court's opinion in Katz v. United States, but Justice Black, the sole dissenter
in that case. Justice Black was eighty-one at the time that Katz was
decided, and some had begun to wonder whether the great civil libertarian had strayed from the path. Subsequent developments surely
suggest the virtue of Justice Black's simpler view of the fourth amendment even if it now seems nearly impossible to return to that view.
I have indicated, moreover, that this article might lead to at least
some begrudging respect for the decisions in Rakas, Rawlings, Miller
and Smith. Whatever their defects, these decisions resisted a potentially far-reaching transformation of the fourth amendment, a transformation whose ramifications could not easily be foreseen.
From my perspective, however, Justice Stewart and the Supreme
Court majority had the better position in Katz; and even if the implications of contrary rulings might prove far reaching, Rakas, Rawlings, Miller and Smith were wrongly decided. Our sense of privacy
is enhanced when we retain the power to make information public
little by little rather than all at once; when we can test, experiment
and grow in interaction with a few without being plunged into interaction with many; when we can share information about ourselves
selectively with those whom we trust; when we can experience friendship and intimacy; in short, when we have security within a zone
of interpersonal privacy. For these reasons, we may sense a significant threat to privacy in decisions that treat dialing a telephone number
no differently from publishing it in a newspaper-and that view placing
property in a friend's purse with the friend's permission no differently from abandoning it on a street corner. Whatever the merits of the
doctrinal criticisms and suggestions that this article has offered, the
protection of interpersonal privacy deserves more careful attention than
it has received.

AFTERWORD: APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE COERCION OF A PERSON TO SERVE AS AN
UNDERCOVER AGENT

This article has considered whether governmental officers might
violate a suspect's fourth amendment rights by coercing another person to reveal information that he has received in confidence from
the suspect. This afterword addresses a related issue-whether it might
violate the fourth amendment for the government to coerce a person
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to serve as an undercover agent in obtaining verbal disclosures from
a suspect. Should an initial obtaining of confidences by a person who
has been coerced to obtain them be treated in the same manner as
a coerced disclosure of past confidences? Analysis of this issue will
focus, not on any special relationship of confidentiality, but simply
on the relationship between a suspect and a confederate in crime.
This analysis may indicate more clearly than the article's discussion
of bailments, required recordkeeping and the informant system how
tangled and confused the courts' treatment of interpersonal privacy
has tended to be.
Just as the fourth amendment issues raised by the coercion of
an informant to reveal a suspect's confidences apparently have never
been litigated, no criminal defendant seems to have argued that the
coercion of someone else to gather confidential verbal information
from him has, without more, violated his fourth amendment rights.
The issue has been litigated in reported decisions only when defendants have alleged that informants were coerced to employ electronic
surveillance equipment in their undercover activities.
Nevertheless, in cases presenting no issues of coercion, the
Supreme Court has endorsed both the constitutional propriety of using
undercover agents to gather information by deception and the propriety
of secretly tape recording conversations in which these agents participate. The leading case is probably United States v. White,'" a
post-Katz decision that reaffirmed some pre-Katz law. Even in the
absence of probable cause and judicial authorization, it is permissible for a government undercover agent to misrepresent his identity
and purpose and thereby obtain confidential disclosures from a
suspect.' 3 6 Moreover, the plurality opinion in White declared:
Concededly a police agent who conceals his police connections may
write down for official use his conversations with a defendant and
testify concerning them. . . . For constitutional purposes, no different result is required if the agent instead of immediately reporting
and transcribing his conversations with defendant, either (1)
simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which he is
135. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
136. Although the Supreme Court has not had occasion to clarify the issue,
most commentators have read the Court's decisions to authorize only certain forms
of deception by undercover agents. Dishonest claims to be an addict in need of a
fix are permissible even when they lead a suspect to "consent" to a physical trespass
by the undercover agent, but dishonest claims to be a gas company employee seeking a meter reading probably are impermissible. See, e.g., White, The Fourth Amend-

ment as a Way of Talking About People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974
SuP. CT. REV. 165, 228-31; Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth
Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 133, 151-52; Grano, supra note 59, at 437-38.
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carrying on his person . . . (2) or carries radio equipment which
simultaneously transmits the conversations either to recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the transmitting
frequency.... If the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose
trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it
protect him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the
conversations which are later offered in evidence to prove the State's
case. 137

Although the issue merits more extended discussion than I can
provide here, the Supreme Court's refusal to differentiate between
undercover agents with tape recorders and undercover agents without
them was probably correct. The principal constitutional issue presented

by the use of undercover agents is the propriety of governmental
spying, and the technology that agents may employ to accomplish
this spying is a secondary consideration at best. Indeed, defendants
and defense attorneys sometimes may have more cogent objections
when undercover agents have failed to use tape recorders than when
they have used them. Law enforcement should not depend on a swearing match between an undercover agent and a defendant when more
authoritative evidence could have been obtained. Accordingly, law
enforcement agencies probably should be encouraged to "wire their
agents for sound" whenever it would not endanger the agents to do
so. The fact that electronic surveillance tends to obtain more complete and accurate evidence than governmental spying without this
electronic assistance is basically a virtue rather than a vice. This afterword will indicate shortly the relevance of this conclusion to the issue
of undercover activity without electronic assistance by an agent who
has been coerced to assume the undercover role.
Despite the impression conveyed by television heroes, undercover
police agents often are not full-time law enforcement officers; instead
they are criminals who have been subjected to substantial pressure
to "get the goods" on other criminals. That was apparently the situation in White;'" even more clearly it was the situation in Hoffa v.
United States,'39 an earlier case upon which White primarily relied.
Issues of coercion lurk in many undercover agent cases. Why have
these issues never been presented? Perhaps at first glance the answer
seems obvious. The invasion of a suspect's privacy is unaffected by
whether the agent who accomplishes this invasion is a public-spirited
volunteer or a person impressed into police service by coercive govern137. White, 401 U.S. at 751.
138. Id. at 747 n.l.
139. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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mental threats. It does not matter to a suspect why an undercover
agent who obtains evidence against him has agreed to aid the police;
all that matters is that he has. Although the government's coercion
of the agent may have violated the agent's rights, the target of his
investigative activity may lack standing to complain.
On occasion, however, fourth amendment decisions differentiate
between enthusiastic volunteers and dragooned draftees. An invasion
of privacy by a draftee may be unconstitutional when an invasion
of privacy by a volunteer would not; and under the fourth amendment, the person whose privacy has been invaded may be allowed
to challenge the voluntariness of this third-party's consent. A series
of variations on Katz may help unfold the issue.
Variation One is a straightforward case of wiretapping. Rather
than place electronic bugging equipment in or on a telephone booth
that they expect Katz to use, law enforcement officers place a tap
on a telephone line and overhear both sides of the conversation between Katz and his customer. The law governing this case is clear.
The wiretap violates the reasonable expectations of privacy of both
Katz and his customer, and both have standing to complain.' 0 In
the absence of probable cause and judicial authorization, the wiretap
violates Katz's fourth amendment rights.
In Variation Two, law enforcement officers know the identity
of Katz's customer. They ask him to help them gather evidence against
Katz by placing a recording device on the customer's telephone.
Without a hint of pressure and simply because he repents his sins
and wishes to atone for them, the customer agrees. Again the law
is clear. Wiretapping with the consent of one of the parties to a conversation does not violate the other party's justifiable expectations
of privacy.'"' A party to a telephone conversation assumes the risk
that the person to whom he speaks will consent to governmental
wiretapping. 142
In Variation Three, Katz's customer does not permit the installation of a recording device on his telephone until law enforcement of140. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).

141. See, e.g., United States v. Hedge, 539 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 1091 (1977).
142. Again, one might analyze this case simply in terms of the fourth amendment's basic requirement of governmental action. The government might have asked
Katz's customer to consent to the wiretapping and might have supplied the necessary
electronic equipment. Nevertheless, so long as the customer assented to the government's proposal without significant inducement or pressure, the invasion of Katz's
privacy can be seen primarily as a product of the customer's betrayal rather than
of intrusive governmental action. See supra notes 64 & 97 and infra note 145.
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ficers threaten to break both of his knees. The coercive threat is
directed to the customer, not to Katz. Does Katz have standing to
complain?
The cases have recognized that he does. 4 3 This variation is similar
to a situation already considered in this article-one in which the police
coerce one resident of a dwelling to consent to a search that uncovers
evidence against another. 4" Variation One, a case of nonconsensual
wiretapping, established that Katz has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his telephone conversations and that governmental invasion of this privacy requires affirmative justification. This justification may consist of probable cause coupled with a judicial warrant;
but, as Variation Two established, it also may consist of the voluntary consent of a customer whom Katz agreed to trust.' 4 ' In Variation Three, affirmative justification in any form is lacking. Coerced
consent is no justification at all. Variation Three, a case of coerced
consent, therefore is indistinguishable from Variation One, a case of
nonconsensual wiretapping.
In Variation Four, a magician or a law professor appears and
snatches away the telephone wire. Law enforcement officers hide a
microphone in a gambler's lapel and direct him to seek incriminating
disclosures from Katz in a face-to-face conversation. Again they
threaten to break the gambler's knees unless he does so. Surely the
invasion of Katz's privacy is unaffected by the fact that the conversation now occurs on a street corner rather than over the telephone,
and judicial decisions have recognized that Katz has standing to litigate
the voluntariness of his customer's consent.'4 6
Finally, in Variation Five, our magician or law professor waves
his wand, and the microphone in the customer's lapel disappears. Law
143. E.g., United States v. Glickman, 604 F.2d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Llinas, 603 F.2d 506, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1979).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 86-97.
145. Once again, I regard this conventional explanation of the courts' rulings
as somewhat misleading and would prefer to view the issue primarily as one of marking
a boundary between governmental and private action. See supra notes 64, 97 & 142.
If, for example, the government had offered Katz's customer $10,000 to consent
to electronic surveillance, the invasion of Katz's privacy would seem primarily a product of governmental action rather than of private betrayal. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34. In the absence of probable cause and judicial authorization,
this surveillance probably should be held unconstitutional. Discussion of the "voluntariness" of the customer's consent, of Katz's assumption or nonassumption of the
risk, or of the customer's consent as "justification" for the search might prove more
misleading than helpful.
146. E.g., United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319, 321-23 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 937 (1979); United States v. Fuentes, 563 F.2d 527, 533 (2d Cir. 1977).
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enforcement officers direct the customer to obtain incriminating
disclosures from Katz in a face-to-face transaction. Perhaps they also
give the customer marked money with which to place his bets and
ask him to give them the betting slips that he receives. Once again,
they back their gentle request with a not-very-gentle threat to the integrity of the customer's kneecaps. Does Katz have standing to
complain?
Of course this case is the one with which we began-the case
in which Katz's lack of standing apparently seemed so clear that no
defense attorney had forced litigation of the issue in a reported decision. But can the presence or absence of a microphone make a critical
difference? In White, the Supreme Court accepted the government's
argument that, to borrow a nice phrase of Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion, it is constitutionally immaterial whether the invasion of
a suspect's privacy is accomplished by a tattle-tale or by a tattle-tale
with a transistor."4 7 Surely it would be unconscionable for the Court
now to reject that argument only because it is advanced by a defendant rather than the government.
This analysis suggests that any distinction between nonconsensual wiretapping (Variation One) and the coercion of an informant
to seek incriminating disclosures without the aid of electronic gimmickry (Variation Five) would not rest on differing expectations of
conversational privacy. A line between these practices would reflect
instead a confounding of the medium with the message.
Nevertheless, courts seem to treat each of the variations on Katz
that I have suggested in a slightly different manner from each of the
others. I have noted, for example, that when one party to a conversation permits the government to attach either a recording device to
his telephone or a microphone to his lapel, the othe-r party to the
conversation may challenge the voluntariness of the consent. Nevertheless, the courts' recognition of this doctrine has seemed more
theoretical than real. Although an informant's consent to electronic
surveillance may have been the product of extreme governmental
148
pressure, courts have routinely found it voluntary.
Several United States Courts of Appeals have been honest enough
to declare that they uphold a person's consent to electronic surveillance
in circumstances in which they would find his consent to a visual
147. See White, 401 U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
148. E.g., United States v. Brandon, 633 F.2d 773, 775-77 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 30-31 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975);
United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782, 788-91 (9th Cir. 1976); Kerr v. State, 256 Ark.
738, 512 S.W.2d 13, cert. denied, 410 U.S. 1110 (1974).
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search or to a seizure of tangible property involuntary.'4 9 The only
reason that they have advanced for this distinction seems unpersuasive.
It is that the "consenting" party may benefit from his acceptance
of the "deal" that the government has offered.' 0 Of course a spouse,
employer or other "third party" also may profit by yielding to coercive pressure to permit the visual search of a home or work place.
More importantly, the courts' concern under the fourth amendment
ought to be, not the welfare of the "consenting" party, but whether
the government has produced an unreasonable invasion of the privacy
of the nonconsenting party, the party who has challenged the government's action.' 5 ' Perhaps, despite Katz and other decisions that seemed
to equate electronic surveillance with more conventional searches, courts
are still captivated to some extent by physical images of the fourth
amendment. The Jungian past of the amendment may persist in
perverse, altered forms.
Wiretapping usually does not involve a trespass upon a suspect's
property, but it usually involves some interference with tangible
property-a wire-in which the parties to a telephone conversation
might be thought to have a metaphysical interest. A microphone in
an undercover agent's lapel does not involve physical interference with
property, but an invasion of privacy aided by this microphone is likely
to seem, not more severe, but vaguely more physical than the same
invasion of privacy without it. If fourth amendment decisions were
to yield to these sentiments, they would deserve to be charged with
incoherence. These physical images are not the crisp, historically
grounded images of Justice Black's dissent in Katz; they seem closer
to the strangely altered images of a drug trip. Any line, for example,
between Variation One (wiretapping with no consent) and Variation
Three (wiretapping with coerced consent); or between Variation Three
(wiretapping with coerced consent) and Variation Four (face-to-face
electronic surveillance with coerced consent); or between Variation Four
(face-to-face electronic surveillance with coerced consent) and Variation Five (coerced face-to-face surveillance without electronic assistance)
would seem substantially more artificial than the property notions re149. United States v. Glickman, 604 F.2d 625, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319, 321-22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979);
United States v. Bonnano, 487 F.2d 654, 658 (2d Cir. 1973).
150. See the cases cited supra note 149.
151. Consider once again a case in which a government officer gives a large
sum of money to an informant in exchange for his permission to engage in electronic surveillance. Although the payment undoubtedly would seem beneficial to the
informant, I do not understand how it could make the invasion of the suspect's
privacy more reasonable.
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jected in Katz. Nevertheless, courts may respond in some degree to
these sentiments. I mentioned at the outset, did I not, that the area
of interpersonal privacy was too difficult for me to fathom?

